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With the development of online services, the traditional paper-based healthcare
services are replaced by the Electronic Health Record System (EHRS) that has con-
tributed significantly to the improvement of individual well-being and public health.
In recent years, advances in EHRS have ameliorated the integration among various
medical practitioners and healthcare givers where medical data could be accessed
more conveniently. This has not only accelerated decision-making procedures but
also saved the users time and money vastly. However, the adoption of EHRS has
arisen a common concern about security and privacy as EHR accumulates sensitive
health data. Therefore, protection of patient privacy and security of EHR must
be considered in designing the EHRS. Although a number of mature cryptographic
tools could be adopted, the nature of complexity of EHRS and sophistical data access
requirements among medical stakeholders in EHRS have made the tasks challenging.
While one of the advantages of EHRS is data sharing, it poses di culties about
how to control data sharing so that security and privacy can be ensured. In this
thesis, we present several novel techniques, which can help to solve some critical
problems we have identified in EHRS. One of the major tools we developed in this
thesis is novel access control technologies for EHRS to solve the security and privacy
issues. The challenge we face is that EHRS is usually operated in a distributed
environment. Although we need to ensure flexibility and scalability in data sharing,
data security against potential attacks must be achieved. Traditional access control
systems are not su cient.
In this thesis, we adopt novel encryption techniques such as attribute-based
encryption and authenticated encryption to achieve access control for the special
needs of EHRS. We allow multiple authorities to better manage the distributed
EHRS such as those operated in the cloud. We present the security protocols in
order to demonstrate how to apply our approaches to real world EHR application.
As an important part of access control technology, access control policies are the
v
core of the entire system. We investigate various access control policies for EHRS.
We present a policy integration approach as a novel solution based on a policy
similarity, which has provided a new way for EHRS in cloud computing, where two
or more access control policies can be integrated in order to suit the need of policy
management. We use XACML as an example to show how this can be done in
practice. We also provide a novel approach for access control policy transformation
in cloud computing, where the policy for the private patient records in a private
cloud can be transformed into a di↵erent policy which can handle access rights for
di↵erent stakeholders.
This thesis also covers the user mobility issues in EHRS. We proposed several
security protocols that capture secure communication between patients and doctors
who are located in di↵erent locations. Our proposed protocols achieve authentica-
tion, confidentiality and anonymity features in remote telemedicine systems. Our
protocols are the first of this kind, which provide sound solutions to user mobility
in EHRS.
Within the scope of this thesis, we present an approach to manage a patient
monitoring system in order to provide e cient authentication and confidentiality
to patient data transmission. Again, we assume that our system is set up in a
distributed environment. We propose a new signcryption scheme which o↵ers the
feature of homomorphism. Therefore, the signencrypted patient data items can be
automatically aggregated without the need of decryption. Our scheme is the first
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1.1 Security and Privacy in EHRS
Electronic health record systems (EHRS) have gained increasing attention due to
the fact that they have prominent impacts on the e ciency of managing and im-
proving the individual’s health. In these systems, traditional paper-based healthcare
is replaced with comprehensive electronic records which o↵er more benefits to hu-
mans than traditional procedures. With the adoption of EHRS, healthcare givers
are enabled to integrate patient records from di↵erent regions and leverage digital
processes, in which health information can be accessed whenever and wherever they
are needed. This has benefited enormously to patient wellness and public health.
An electronic health record (EHR) involves di↵erent types of information (e.g.
medication, laboratory test results, medical history), and benefits doctors, pa-
tients, healthcare providers and governments in several aspects. In an EHRS, pa-
tient records can be shared across authorised stakeholders, enabling patients to
receive heterogeneous medical services e ciently and e↵ectively. Developments of
distributed systems lead to improvement in the communication among users and
patients’ treatment procedures on the grounds that medical records are accessible
to intended doctors at any time. This not only helps doctors in better decision
making but also reduces the barrier of time, cost, and location, whereas these chal-
lenges have been unavoidable in traditional medical systems. It also benefits the
governments through improvement in the level of public health and economic state
of the society. Although numerous benefits of EHRS have been identified, security
and privacy requirements have remained challenging issues in EHR systems. It is
important to build an EHRS that also achieves security and privacy to prevent the
contents of EHR systems from disclosing to the unauthorised parties.
2
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There are existing impediments to the implementation of secure and privacy-
preserved EHRS. For example, patient medical history must not be accessed by
unauthorised parties other than the authorised doctors and the corresponding pa-
tient. While, in some circumstances, patient records are needed to be accessed to
physicians, such as in emergency conditions, and might be required to be shared to
o↵er comprehensive healthcare services in an ubiquitous environment. In large-scale
healthcare systems, an EHR system is often operated in a distributed environment;
therefore, multiple authorities and users with various access levels are involved.
Hence, a much more sophisticated security design has to be in place.
To achieve security and privacy in EHRS, designing fine-grained access control
mechanisms play a fundamental role. The implementation of access control mecha-
nisms in the system limits the data access to only authorised users, preventing any
unauthorised accesses to data. There are various types of access control models, in-
cluding attribute-based access control (ABAC), role-based access control (RBAC),
and cryptographic access control (CAC)[RWS15]. There are also pre-defined access
control policies and standards to assure secure access to users’ data, such as ISO
standards, XACML, HIPAA, etc; however, flexibility in accessing patient’s data has
been accounted as one of the desired features in the security designs.
The access control designs are required to o↵er flexibility while the system is
distributed or shared among di↵erent enterprises. Then, secure data sharing can
increase the flexibility and availability of delivery of care where users are located at
di↵erent places. Secure data sharing relies on cryptography, which o↵ers various se-
curity services including authentication, data integrity and confidentiality. Security
implementations are required to consider the scalability of medical systems in re-
mote area networks or distributed environments where databases are not centralised.
Notably, the data exchanging on the communication channels has to be protected
against any modification and loss.
1.2 Motivation of research
Despite previous attempts to secure electronic health record systems, there are still
increasing demands to improve security and privacy. Our motivation of research
mainly focuses on improving security and privacy in EHRS in terms of realistic
applications such as cloud computing, distributed databases, etc. In the following,
we present some desirable security requirements for EHRS we consider.
1.2. Motivation of research 4
Confidentiality:
Storing/retrieving unprotected EHRs on/from networked databases poses major
threats to health data security due to the disclosure of crucial data to various forms
of online and o✏ine adversaries. The unprotected patient’s information stored on
local or distributed databases can be easily accessed and modified by unauthorised
people. Any modification of patient’s medical status or medical history leads to fatal
consequences. In order to prevent unauthorised accesses and ensure confidentiality,
encryption techniques need to be employed. Cryptography plays an important role in
ensuring the secure data storage and transmission. A variety of solutions including
asymmetric-key encryption schemes and symmetric-key encryption schemes have
been proposed.
Encryption technologies can be regarded as primitive tools to implement access
control in the EHR systems. Although there are a variety of methods which can
be applied to access control, encryption technologies have played a main role at
the lower level of the computer system to implement access control. For example,
with a simple symmetric-key encryption, the encrypted data can only be accessed
by the authorised user who holds the key. Similarly, in the asymmetric-key system,
the public-key encryption only allows the authorised user who holds the private
key to decrypt the encrypted data with the sender’s public key. It is noticed that
asymmetric-key schemes are more expressive and powerful in construction of fine-
grained access control systems. For example, data access control can be achieved
through identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84] where public keys are identities
of users, such as name and email address, and can be used as the subjects in an
access control approach. It can be also applied to role-based access controls where
the access rights are allocated to users based on their roles. With attribute-based
encryption (ABE), we can achieve fine-grained sharing of encryped data [GPSW06],
which is even more expressive access control. Two di↵erent types of ABE have been
proposed by Pandey et al. [GPSW06] and Bethencourt et al. [BSW07], respectively,
including ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE), and key policy
attribute based encryption (KP-ABE). The encryption schemes could be employed
based on the system’s requirements, whether a policy based is desired or key based.
In IBE schemes, the receiver and sender in the encryption scenario have to obtain
their private keys from a trusted third party (private key generator or PKG). The
implementation of centralised trusted authorities in IBE has become a controversial
issue, because they could become bottlenecks when many users are involved. ABE
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schemes also inherit the issue, unfortunately. The potential solution is to utilise mul-
tiple authorities; therefore, the task of PKG can be handled by multiple authorities
[Cha07, CC09]. Decentralised ABE approaches have shown potential applicability in
EHRS, which is usually large with users who reside in di↵erent geographic locations.
Nonetheless, the implementation of cryptographic solutions in practice is chal-
lenging, in terms of their computational costs and technical complexities. Some
medical devices might have limited computational power, and lightweight algorithms
are required to their operations. For example, body sensor devices, which are used
to monitor patient’s vital health status, are required to proceed quickly.
Authentication:
While encryption protects the data, it does not guarantee that the sender is
genuine. Then, authentication as one of the most important security requirements
for EHR systems assures the origin of the sender. Authentication could be addressed
with several methods: (1) In a symmetric-key encryption scheme, the sender and
the receiver can properly authenticate each other through a mutual authentication
protocol. The idea is that the secret key shared between them is known to each
party; therefore, the encrypted message indicates that the encryptor/sender is the
legitimate user, while the receiver can correctly decrypt the message. When the
encrypted response has been received from the receiver, the sender acknowledges that
the receiver is legitimate. This approach of authentication has been widely applied
in networked systems in order to build private communication protocols. (2) As a
more e cient analogous scheme, Message Authentication Code (MAC) can provide
a similar function, where the MAC key is shared by the sender and receiver only.
The computation of a MAC is more e cient than an encryption. The MAC based
authentication schemes have been widely adopted in computer networks such as
IPSec. (3) Public-key cryptography can o↵er more powerful authentication schemes,
especially with digital signatures. As a digital signature can only be generated by
the signer who owns the private signing key, the verifier of the signature can be
confirmed of legitimacy of the signer with the corresponding public key; therefore,
the authenticity of the claimed sender and message can be confirmed. This also
provides integrity properties, i.e. the sender can not deny its action in sending the
data and more importantly the data has not been modified in transmission. In this
thesis, we adopted all these approaches to build novel secure EHR systems to meet
our goals.
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Privacy:
In EHR systems, privacy is ensured by protecting the patient identities and
data from disclosing to unauthorised parties. There are various users in an EHRS;
including doctors, specialists, nurses, pharmacists and patients who should be given
di↵erent privileges for data access. This can be achieved through granting proper
access rights to authorised users, restricting any unauthorised access to patient data.
To protect data privacy, the usual access control mechanisms can help. That is, once
the data is encrypted, only the authorised users can access it. However, to achieve
identity privacy, we could utilise di↵erent approaches. Obviously, encryption of
identity can help to protect identity privacy. This approach can be usually applied to
database environment. In networked systems, the IP numbers or network addresses
need to be protected as well, as they can be regarded as identification information of
patients. In this case, we cannot apply traditional encryption schemes as computer
networks require the IP numbers to deliver the network packets. Therefore, we need
to handle this with di↵erent approaches. One of the solutions is to apply subliminal
identities [MV96], or we could utilise MIX NET.
Distributed systems and security:
Since, in the real world, medical centres reside in various geographical locations,
healthcare providers need to provide medical systems that o↵er services to patients
and doctors in large-scale distributed systems. However, providing electronic health
services to users who reside in remote or rural areas is challenging. This becomes
more significant when accessing a specialist who mostly resides in a metropolitan
area is inconvenient and costly. The medical systems, consequently, need to be
designed to provide users mobility, in which remote users also can benefit from
medical cares. Data sharing in distributed systems, however, has raised security
and privacy concerns because multiple users can access the data. How to establish
security and privacy protections while allowing remote patients to access doctors at
any location is a research challenge.
In a distributed environment, patients are managed by di↵erent healthcare givers
(e.g. hospitals) that handle users registrations and treatment procedures. Since a
central authority can not handle data access for healthcare services, cloud comput-
ing as an e↵ective solution enables ubiquitous and on-demand data access through
sharing the computing resources. Such systems have both advantages and disadvan-
tages to both users and healthcare providers. While users receive medical services
1.3. Thesis Contributions 7
wherever and whenever they need, saving cost and time.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
While various security safeguards and privacy protections have been proposed in
EHRS, there are still many research challenges to be solved. In order to investigate
the current security gaps and provide e↵ective solutions, we performed a literature
review on security and privacy aspects of electronic health record (EHR) systems
[RWS15], from technical perspectives. We have done an exhaustive search on re-
lated works of security and privacy implementations and current issues in electronic
healthcare systems. We have identified the most important features that are sig-
nificant in the implementation of electronic health record systems. As a result,
access control policies, data sharing and cryptography techniques in the literature
are highlighted as important aspects of security and privacy implementations in
EHR systems.
Since electronic health records could be operated in large-scale distributed envi-
ronments, handling the patient data access becomes significant. In these systems,
implementing a central authority results in a bottleneck where there are many users
in the system. We proposed a secure multi-authority framework that handles system
users in a large-scale distributed environment [RMSW16]. Our solution controls the
access to EHR data and improves the scalability and applicability of an EHR system
in a distributed environment, such as cloud computing. Accordingly, we proposed
our system model and attribute-based protocols that sketch the secure communica-
tion channels among users. We also presented an application scenario that shows
the applicability of our solutions.
Security and privacy preservation are prominent when data is shared in a dis-
tributed system, and there are various domains with distinct access requirements.
Therefore, an access control method needs to be defined for privacy protection of
EHRs. Encryption techniques can be used in order to protect data content against
any unauthorised modification, however, access control policies are needed to be
transformed to adapt for the situation. We proposed an access control policy mech-
anism for privacy preservation and policy transformation of Electronic health records
in hybrid clouds [RM16]. With our solution, an EHR access-control policy can be
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transformed from a private cloud to a public cloud while it is encrypted. The trans-
formed data remains confidential while it is re-encrypted and shared among autho-
rised users. Our novel solution contributes to data sharing in EHR systems where
handling di↵erent access control policies among di↵erent clouds seems unachievable.
In distributed systems, integration of access control policies is important to pro-
vide comprehensive care, but this is inevitable without access control policy combi-
nation mechanisms. How to combine policies to provide flexibility of access rights in
which users’ features are dynamic, i.e., users’ locations and access rights are changing
in dynamic systems, is challenging. We introduced an XACML access control policy
combination mechanism which handles multiple access control policies through a
similarity analysis phase [RM17a]. Our solution contributes to distributed systems
where flexibility in access control policies is desired in system developments. Accord-
ing to our solution, di↵erent XACML policies are evaluated to decide whether they
can be combined or not. The similarity analysis and combination algorithms are
proposed to combine the heterogeneous access control policies and o↵er comprehen-
sive services at a large-scale healthcare system. Our solution fosters interoperability
and scalability among healthcare providers while preserving patient’s privacy and
data security.
In recent years, with the adoption of telemedicine systems, it has become fea-
sible to provide health services to remote patients. However, providing secure
telemedicine systems which capture users mobility and privacy is still challeng-
ing. We proposed security protocols that capture patients and doctors mobility
in telemedicine systems [RM17b]. Our solution contributes to telemedicine services
in remote and rural areas where patients and doctors can establish consultation
sessions at any time and location they reside. We presented di↵erent practical
application scenarios which demonstrate communication sessions among users and
the intermedia servers. We employed symmetric-key encryption in our protocols
that assures security and privacy of data exchange. Our protocols achieve patient
anonymity, data confidentiality, data integrity, freshness and mutual authentication
features.
Patient monitoring applications have been widely adopted in healthcare systems.
However, ensuring data security and patients privacy where e ciency has not ad-
versely a↵ected is under debate. In patient monitoring devices, patient’s health
data (e.g. blood pressure, body temperature) is sent to the doctor for the evalua-
tion of patient’s health status; however, the data needs to be protected against any
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modification or lost. We proposed a provably secure homomorphic sign-encryption
scheme for patient monitoring devices which ensures data integrity, confidentiality
and authentication [RMZ17]. Our novel solution addresses IND-CPA and Weak Un-
forgeability (WUF) security goals under DDH and CDH assumptions, respectively.
We contribute to patient monitoring devices in ensuring confidentiality, integrity
and authentication where the collected data in a timely manner can be used by
doctor to improve the patient’s health.
1.4 Thesis Organisation
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
In chapter 2, we review the preliminaries used in this thesis. We introduce the
complexity assumptions, security notions and algebra knowledge. In addition, we
present some basic cryptographic primitives which are being used in our schemes,
including hash function, random oracle model, public key encryption, sequences
of games, digital signature and signcryption. We also review the preliminary of
XACML structure.
In chapter 3, we develop a multi-authority security framework for scalable EHR
systems in a distributed environment. We present the system models and security
protocols that improve scalability in the medical systems.
In chapter 4, we design a dynamic access control transformation mechanism that
enables the health information sharing in a distributed environment. We also present
the system models along with the application scenario.
In chapter 5, we propose an access control policy combination scheme from sim-
ilarity analysis in the secure and privacy-preserved EHR systems. We illustrate an
access control policy combination framework in XACML and algorithms that evalu-
ate di↵erent policies for similarities. We also give the instances of real case scenarios
and access control policies in XACML.
In chapter 6, we construct practical and secure protocols for user mobility in
telemedicine systems. We illustrate di↵erent application scenarios and relevant pro-
tocols. Our solutions enable secure and privacy preserved Telemedicine systems for
remote patients.
In chapter 7, we propose a novel homomorphic sign-encryption scheme and illus-
trate its application in patient monitoring devices. We present the system model,
security model and the security analysis of our scheme.
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Finally, in chapter 8 we discuss our future research and conclude this thesis.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This thesis consists of security protocols, access control schemes, security policies and
cryptographic schemes. To aid the reader, this chapter introduces related prelimi-
naries and notions which have been used throughout this thesis, and illustrates the
foundations of algebra, complexity assumptions and cryptographic tools. For more
information regarding the cryptography foundations refer to [Mao04, Gol04, Sho06].
2.1 Abstract Algebra
Denote by Z = {· · · , 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, · · · } the set of integers. Zp denotes the set of
{0, · · · , p 1} where p is a prime number and Z⇤p is the set of positive integers smaller
than p and relatively prime to p,
Z⇤p = {n|1  n  p, gcd(n, p) = 1}.
Denote by   a security parameter and by 1  the string of   ones and denoted by
r
R Zp the polynomial r which is randomly selected from the polynomial ring Zp
consisting of the polynomials that coe cients are from the finite field Zp.
We say that a function ✏ : Z! R is negligible if for all k 2 Z, there exists N 2 Z
such that ✏(n)  1
nk
for all n > N . By ✏, we always denote a negligible function that
is asymptotically smaller than any inverse polynomial function.
For any a, b 2 Z, we have gcd(a, b) as the greatest common divisor of a and b.
We say that a, b 2 Z are “relatively prime” if gcd(a, b) = 1; otherwise a, b 2 Z are
“composite”.
2.2 Foundations of Algebra
In this section, we review the basic algebra knowledge, including field, group and
cyclic group.
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2.2. Foundations of Algebra 12
2.2.1 Field
Field consists of a set of elements and two operations defined between any two
elements in the set.
Definition 2.1 (Field) A field (F, ,  ) consists of a set F and two operations:
addition   and multiplication  , and satisfies the following properties,
- Addition Group. (F, ) is an Abelian group. The identity of the group (F, )
is denoted as 0F ( additive identity or zero-element);
- Multiplication Group. Let F⇤ = F   {0F}. (F⇤,  ) is an Abelian group. The
identity of the group (F⇤,  ) is denoted as 1F ( multiplicative identity);
- Distributivity. 8a, b, c 2 F, (a  b)   c = (a   c)  (b   c).
2.2.2 Group
A group G is a set of elements with a binary operation   which is executed between
any two elements in the set. If a, b 2 G, then we write a   b.
Definition 2.2 (Group) A group (G,  ) is a non-empty set G equipped with a
binary operation   over elements in G, satisfying the following properties,
- Closure. 8a, b 2 G, then a   b 2 G.
- Associativity. 8a, b, c 2 G, such that (a   b)   c = a   (b   c).
- Existence of an identity. 9eG 2 G, 8b 2 G, such that eG   b = b   eG = b 2 G.
- Existence of inverses. 8a 2 G, 9a 1 2 G, such that a   a 1 = a 1   a = 1G.
For simplicity, a group (G,  ) is often denoted as G when the operation   is
clear in the context. The number of the elements in G is called the order of G and
denoted as n = |G| where g 2 G, gn = 1 (1 denote to the identity of group G). A
group G is a finite group if |G| is finite; otherwise, it is an infinite group. Let G(1 )
be a group generator which takes as input 1  and outputs a group G with order p,
namely G(1 )! (p,G).
If the binary operation   is an addition “+”, then the group is called an “additive
group” where the identity element is denoted by 0G (Zero element), and the inverse
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of an element a 2 G is denoted by  a. If the binary operation   is a multiplication
“.”, then the group is called a multiplicative group where the identity element is
denoted by 1G, and the inverse of an element a 2 G is denoted by a 1.
We say a group (G,  ) is an Abelian group if it has the following property,
- Community. 8a, b 2 G, a   b = b   a.
Definition 2.3 (Order of Group Element) Suppose that g 2 G, the order of g
in G is the least i 2 Z+ such that gi = 1G. If for all i 2 Z+, gi 6= 1G, the order of g
is infinite. The order of g is denoted as ord(g) = |G|.
Especially, if any element in a group G can be expressed by a specially element
in G, G is called as a cyclic group. The formal definition of a cyclic group is as
follows:
Definition 2.4 (Cyclic Group) A group G is a cyclic group if there exists g 2 G
such that G = {gi|i 2 Z}. The element g is called a generator of the group G. G is
said to be generated by g and represented as G = hgi.
Definition 2.5 (Isomorphism) Let G,G0 be groups wrt the operations  G,  G0, re-
spectively. A function ⇢ : G! G0 is an isomorphism from G to G0 if,
- ⇢ is a bijection,
- 8a, b 2 G then ⇢(a  G b) = ⇢(a)  G0 ⇢(b).
2.3 Bilinear Groups
In this section, we review the knowledge related to bilinear groups.
Definition 2.6 ( Bilinear Map on Prime Order Groups) [BF03]. Let G1, G2
be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let G⌧ be a multiplicative group of
prime order p. Let g1 and g2 be the generators of G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear
map (pairing) e : G1 ⇥G2 ! G⌧ satisfies the following properties,
1. Bilinearity. 8x 2 G1, y 2 G2 and a, b 2 Zp, e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab.




is the identity element in G⌧ .
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3. Computability. For all a 2 G1, b 2 G2, there exists an e cient algorithm to
compute e(a, b).
Definition 2.7 ( Bilinear Map) [BF03]. Let G,G⌧ be cyclic groups of order n,
where n = pq and p, q be two prime numbers. Let g1 be the generator of G1 and g2
be the generator of G2. A bilinear map (pairing) e : G1 ⇥ G2 ! GT on composite
order groups satisfies the following properties,
1. Bilinearity. 8g1 2 G1, 8g2 2 G2 and 8a, b 2 Zp, e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab.




is the identity element in GT .
Definition 2.8 (Bilinear Groups) [GPS08]. G1,G2,GT construct a bilinear group
if there exists a bilinear map e : G1 ⇥G2 ! GT , where |G1| = |G2| = |GT | = p.
Galbraith et al. [GPS08] divided pairing operations used in cryptography into
three types:
- Type 1: G1 = G2;
- Type 2: G1 6= G2, there exists an e ciently computable homomorphism map
 : G2 ! G1;
- Type 3: G1 6= G2, there are no e ciently computable homomorphism maps
between groups G1 and G2.
When G1 = G2, the pairing is symmetric (there exists e ciently computable
isomorphism between the two groups) and we denote the symmetric bilinear group
as (e, p,G1,G⌧ ). However, when G1 6= G2 the pairings are asymmetric. Since,
pairing is often constructed on elliptic curves, G1 and G2 are subgroups of the group
of points on an elliptic curve, its e ciency is dependent on the selected elliptic curves
over the finite fields.
2.4 Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we review the complexity assumptions used throughout this thesis.
Definition 2.9 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption) [Odl84]. Let G = hgi
be a cyclic group of prime order p generated by a generator g. Given g 2 G, we say
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that the discrete logarithm assumption holds on G if no PPT adversary A can com-
pute ga such that a 2R Zp with the the advantage
AdvDLA = Pr [g
a  A(p, g,G)]   ✏( )
where the probability is taken over the random choice of gb 2 G and the bits consumed
by the adversary A.
The DL assumption assumes that the advantage AdvDLA is negligible for any prob-
abilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A under the security parameter 1 
Definition 2.10 (Computational Di e-Hellman (CDH) Assumption) [DH76].
Let G = hgi be a cyclic group of prime order p generated by a generator g. Given
g, ga, gb 2 G for randomly selected a, b 2R Zp, there exists an algorithm A that
computes gab with the advantage
AdvCDHA = Pr
⇥
gab  A(G, p, g, ga, gb)
   a, b,2R Zp,G = hgi
⇤
.
The CDH assumption assumes that the advantage AdvCDHA is negligible for any PPT
algorithm A under the security parameter 1 .
Definition 2.11 (Decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) Assumption) [Bon98]. Let
G = hgi and a, b 2R Zp as described in the CDH assumption. Given g, ga, gb, there









1 A(G, p, g, ga, gb, Z)
  Z 2R G
⇤  
The DDH assumption assumes that the advantage AdvDDHA is negligible for any PPT
algorithm A under the security parameter 1 .
2.5 Cryptographic Tools
In this section, we introduce some useful cryptographic tools, including hash func-
tion, random oracle model, public-key encryption, sequences of games, digital sig-
nature, signcryption and an overview of XACML.
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2.5.1 Hash Function
The universal classes of hash functions were introduced by Carter and Wegman
[CW79]. A hash function H : {0, 1}⇤ ! {0, 1}n is a deterministic function that
takes as input an arbitray length string and outputs a fixed length string. A hash
function o↵ers the following properties [Mao04],
- Pre-image resistance. Given a hash function H : X ! Y and value y, it is
computationally infeasible to find a value x 2 X such that H(x) = y;
- Second pre-image resistance. Given a hash function H : X ! Y and value
x 2 X, there is no e cient mechanism to find x0 2 X such that x 6= x0 and
H(x) = H(x0);
- Collusion resistance. Given a hash function H : X ! Y, it is computationally
infeasible to find x, x0 2 X such that x 6= x0 and H(x) = H(x0).
Hash functions with pre-image resistance and second pre-image resistance prop-
erties are denoted as “One-Way Hash Functions (OWHF)”. The hash functions
with second pre-image resistance and collision resistance are denoted as “Collision
Resistance Hash Functions”.
Hash functions play an important role as cryptographic primitives and building
blocks to create encryption schemes and provide integrity in digital signatures, en-
cryption, key agreement protocols, Message Authentication Code (MAC) [BCK96],
etc.
Message Authentication Code (MAC), introduced by Carter andWegman [CW79],
is known as “Tag”. MAC is a short piece of information that added to the message
for its authentication, i.e. to confirm the authenticity of the sender. Since comput-
ing a MAC require a secret key, it ensures data integrity as well as authenticity of
the message.
2.5.2 Random Oracle Model
The random oracle model was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] where a
hash function is treated as a black box and the computation of hash value is possible
through oracle queries. A random oracle is a hash function that responds to every
query with a truly random space. By theory, the output of a hash function (random
oracle) is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over its
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output space. A random oracle combines the properties of deterministic, e cient
and uniform output. In this model, an entity called “Simulator” simulates each
party’s behaviour, in which that party makes a random oracle query to the random
oracle H in order to obtain an output on a specific value x. Then, the simulator
S, which contains an H-table, checks the pairs (x,H(x)) in the H-table. If there
exists such a query, the S returns the value H(x); otherwise, S creates a new value
(x,H(x)) uniformly at random from the output space of H and stores new value in
the current table.
Random oracle models are e cient tools to prove the security of schemes, in
which we can construct a reduction of the action of an adversary A in breaking the
security of the scheme. Overall, protocols designed in this model are more e cient
than those in standard model. However, as stated in [CGH04] a scheme which is
proven to be secure in random oracle model is not necessarily secure in the standard
model; unless otherwise mentioned so.
2.5.3 Public-Key Encryption
Public key cryptography (PKC) was introduced by Di e and Hellman [DH76] in
which two parties, sender and receiver, can communicate over a public communica-
tion channel without threatening the security of the system.
A public key encryption (PKE) is an asymmetric scheme that issues two dif-
ferent keys as secret key SK and public key PK to each party, as encryption key
and decryption key. This is opposed to symmetric encryption schemes that de-
cryption key and encryption key are the same. We can define a PKE scheme
PKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) as following,
Setup(1 ) ! params. Taking a security parameter 1  as input, it outputs the
system public parameters params.
KeyGen(params)! (SK,PK). Taking the public parameters params as input, it
outputs an encryption (public) key and decryption (private) key pair (PK, SK).
Enc(params, PK,M)! C. Taking the public parameters params, public key PK
and plaintext message M as input, it outputs a ciphertext C.
Dec(params, SK,C)!M. Taking the public parameters params, private key SK
and ciphertext C, it outputs plaintext message M if the ciphertext is valid;
otherwise, outputs ?.
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In public key encryption, there are three di↵erent types of adversaries, namely,
Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA), non-adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA)
and adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA2). In CPA, an adversary has access
to an encryption oracle where can query any message of its choice and receive the
corresponding encryption. In CCA, which is a stronger model than CPA, an ad-
versary has access to a decryption oracle and can query any ciphertext of its choice
to receive its corresponding plaintext. However, in CCA2, compared with CCA, an
adversary can query to decryption oracle after receiving the challenge ciphertext,
with the restriction that it can not send the challenge ciphertext again.
We can define a public key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec)
security models as following,
Definition 2.13 (IND-CPA) A public key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen,
Enc,Dec) is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen plaintex attacks (IND-CPA)








Setup. Simulator S runs Setup(params) to generate the public parameters params
and sends them to adversary A.
KeyGen. S runs KeyGen(params) to generate the secret key and public key pair
(SK,PK) and sends the public parameters params with the public key PK
to A.
Challenge. A submits two messages m0,m1 2 M , M 2 {0, 1} with equal length.
S randomly selects mb and computes C⇤ = Enc(params, PK,mb), where b 2
{0, 1}. S responds A with C⇤.
Guess. A outputs its guess b0 on b 2 {0, 1}. A wins the game if b0 = b.
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Definition 2.14 (IND-CCA) A public key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen,
Enc, Dec) is indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) if no








Setup. Simulator S runs Setup(1 ) to generate the public parameters params and
sends them to adversary A.
KeyGen. S runs KeyGen(params) to generate the secret key and public key pair
(SK,PK) and sends the public parameters params with the public key PK
to A.
Phase 1. A adaptively queries the decryption oracle. A submits a ciphertext C to
S, where C = Enc(param, PK,m). S runs Dec(params, SK,C) and responds
A with m. This query can be made multiple times.
Challenge. A submits two messages m0,m1 2 M , M 2 {0, 1} with equal length.
S randomly selects mb and computes C⇤ = Enc(params, PK,mb), where b 2
{0, 1}. S responds A with C⇤.
Phase 2. A adaptively query the decryption oracle. A submits a ciphertext C to
S, where C 6= C⇤. This query can be made multiple times.
Guess. A outputs its guess b0 on b 2 {0, 1}. A wins the game if b0 = b.
Definition 2.15 (IND-CCA2) A public key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen,
Enc, Dec) is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-
CCA2) if no PPT adversary A making at most q-decryption queries can win the
game with the advantage,
AdvIND-CCA2A =
    Pr[b




2.5.4 Sequences of Games
The sequences of games or “Game-Hopping” is a tool for taming the complexity
in security proofs while the security proofs might become complicated and messy.
Generally, there are three types of game hop: bridging steps, transitions based on
indistinguishability and transitions based on (small) failure events.
2.5. Cryptographic Tools 20
Bridging steps. This form of game hop represents the ground of the game from the
adversary A’s point of view. There is no change in the environment and makes
the A’s probability of breaking the scheme as Pr[Ei] = Pr[Ei+1].
Transitions based on indistinguishability. In this game hop a small change between
two games, if detected by A, can lead to an e cient method to distinguish
among two distributions that are indistingishable. In that way, we can con-
struct an algorithm D that interpolates among two successive games, and eval-
uates the di↵erence among two games. The indistinguishability assumption
should imply that Pr[Ei]  Pr[Ei+1] is negligible.
Transitions based on (small) failure events. In this type of transition, one can argue
that two successive games proceed identically unless one event failed, then we
can construct a di↵erence lemma that computes Pr[Ei]  Pr[Ei+1].
In order to construct the sequences of games proposed by Victor Shoup [Sho04],
we need to proceed as follows,
1. Construct. One constructs a sequences of games, Game 0, Game 1, ..., Game
n, where Game 0 is the original attack game with respect to adversary A and
cryptographic primitive;
2. Define. Let E0 be the event for i = {1, · · · ., n} that defines an event Ei in
Game i related to the definition of E;
3. Proof. The Pr[Ei] is negligibily close to Pr[Ei+1] for i = {0, · · · ., n  1}, and
that Pr[En] is equal to (or negligibly close) the “Target Probability”.
In constructing proofs, the changes among successive games should be very small,
in which the changes can be possible. Then, through one transition, if an adver-
sary is successful to detect a small change, we would imply an e cient method
of distinguishing between two indistinguishable distributions. Then, to prove that
|Pr[Ei]  Pr[Ei+1]| is negligible, we need to construct a distinguishing algorithm D
that interpolates between two games Game i and Game i + 1 with a distinguisher
algorithm A.
Basically, one can design a “hybrid” game which is the combination of the two
games and takes an auxiliary input. That means, one get Game i if the auxiliary
input is derived from D1 and get Game i + 1 if it is driven from D2. Therefore,
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the constructed distinguisher algorithm D runs the hybrid game with its input and
outputs 1 if the relevant event occurs.
2.5.5 Digital Signature
The digital signature scheme proposed by Di e and Hellman [DH76] is the elec-
tronic format of a handwritten signature. A digital signature o↵ers useful security
properties, including integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Integrity means
that data has not been modified during transmission. Authentication convinces the
receiver that the data is sent from the authorised sender. Non-repudiation indicates
that the user can not deny its action on the data. In fact, a valid digital signature
can convince the verifier that the data is generated by the authorised party for the
public access.
A digital signature scheme consists of the following four algorithms [GJKR96],
Setup(1 ) ! params. The setup algorithm takes as input security parameter 1 
and outputs the public parameters params.
KeyGen(params)! (SK,PK). The key generation algorithm takes as input secu-
rity parameter 1  and outputs a secret key and public key pair (SK,PK).
Sign(params, SK,M)!  (M). The signature algorithm takes as input the public
parameters params, the secret key SK and a message M , and outputs a
signature  (M) on message M .
Verify(params,M, PK,  ) ! 1/0. The verification algorithm takes as input the
public parameters params, the message M , the public key PK and the sig-
nature  (M), and outputs 1 if Sign(params,M, SK) !  (M); otherwise, it
outputs 0.










A digital signature scheme should basically achieve the security notion of existen-
tial unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack (EU-CMA) [GMR88]. The
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EU-CMA secure scheme is defined as the following game that is executed between a
simulator S and adversary A,
Setup. S runs Setup(1 ) algorithm to output the public parameters params and
then sends them to A.
KeyGen. S runs KeyGen(params) algorithm to output a secret and public key pair
(SK,PK) and sends PK to A.
Query. A adaptively queries the signature oracle.
A sends a messageM to S. S runs Sign(params, SK,M) algorithm to generate
a signature  (M) and responds A with  . The query can be repeated many
times.
Forgery. A outputs a message and signature pair (M⇤,  ⇤).
A wins the game if M⇤ has not been queried in the signature oracle, and
Verify(params,M⇤, PK,  ⇤)! 1.
Definition 2.17 (EU-CMA) A digital signature scheme is (⌧, q, ✏(1 ))-existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) if no probability
polynomial time (PPT) adversary A can win the game with the advantage
AdvEU-CMAA = Pr [Verify(params,M
⇤, PK,  ⇤)! 1]   ✏(1 )
in the above security model.
There is a stronger notion of EU-CMA that is called strongly existential unforge-
ability under an adaptive chosen message attack (SEU-CMA) [ADR02], as following
game,
Setup. S runs Setup(1 ) to output the public parameters params and sends them
to A.
KeyGen. S runs KeyGen(params) to output a secret and public key pair (SK,PK)
and sends PK to A.
Query. A adaptively query the signature oracle. A adaptively sends messages
{M1,M2, · · · ,Mq} to S. S runs Sign(params, SK,Mi) to generate a signature
 i(Mi) and responds A with  i, for i = {1, 2, · · · , q}.
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Forgery. A outputs a message and signature pair (M⇤,  ⇤). A wins the game if
(M⇤,  ⇤) has not been queried before (M⇤,  ⇤) /2 {(M1,  1), (M2,  2), · · · , (Mq,  q)}
and Verify(params,M⇤, PK,  ⇤)! 1.
Definition 2.18 (SEU-CMA) A digital signature scheme is (⌧, ✏(1 ))-strongly ex-
istentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (SEU-CMA) if no
PPT adversary A can win the game with the advantage
AdvSEU-CMAA = Pr [Verify(params,M
⇤, PK,  ⇤)! 1]   ✏(1 )
in the above security model.
2.5.6 Signcryption
A signcryption scheme [Yul97] consists of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
(Setup, KeyGen, Signcrypt, DeSigncrypt, Verify).
Setup(1 ) ! params. The setup algorithm takes as input security parameter 1 
and outputs the system public parameters params.
KeyGen(params)! (SKs, PKs). The key generation algorithm takes as input the
system public parameters params and outputs a secret key and public key
pair (SKs, PKs) of the sender.
KeyGen(params)! (SKr, PKr). The key generation algorithm takes as input the
system public parameters params and outputs a secret key and public key
pair (SKr, PKr) of the receiver.
Signcrypt(params, SKs, PKr,M)! SC(M). The signcryption algorithm takes as
input the public parameters params, the secret key of the sender SKs, the
public key of the receiver PKr and a message M , and outputs a signcryption
SC(M) on message M .
DeSigncrypt(params, SKr, PKs, SC(M))! M . The signcryption algorithm takes
as input the public parameters params, the secret key of the receiver SKr, the
public key of the sender PKs and a sigcrypted message SC(M), and outputs
the plaintext message M .
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Verify(params, SC(M),M 0, PKs, SKr)! 1/0. The verification algorithm takes as
input the public parameters params, the signcrypted message SC(M) ,the
designcrypted message M 0, the sender’s public key PKs and the receiver’s
private key SKr, and outputs 1 if M = M 0; otherwise, it outputs 0.
Definition 2.19 (Completeness) For any M , KeyGen(1 ) ! (SKs, PKs) and
KeyGen(1 ) ! (SKr, PKr) such that SKs 6= SKr, a signcryption SC is complete
if the following holds,
DeSigncrypt(SC(M,SKs, PKr), SKr)!M,
Verify(M 0, SC(m), SKr, PKs)! 1.
The security models of signcryption that have been employed in this thesis are
confidentiality and unforgeability, as follows.
Definition 2.20 (Confidentiality) A signcryption scheme is semantically secure
against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) if no PPT adversary has a non-negligible
advantage in the following game,
Setup. Simulator S runs Setup(1 ) to generate the public parameters params and
sends them to adversary A.
KeyGen. S runs KeyGen(params) to generate the secret key and public key pair
for the receiver (SKr, PKr) and sends the public parameters params with the
public key of the receiver PKr to A.
Challenge. A submits two messages m0,m1 2M of equal length where M 2 {0, 1}
and the secret key of the sender SKs. If PKr 6= PKs and PKr is valid then S
randomly selects mb and computes SC⇤  Signcrypt(params, PKr, SKs,mb),
where b 2 {0, 1}. S responds A with SC⇤. Otherwise, it returns ?.
Guess. A outputs its guess b0 on b 2 {0, 1}. A wins the game if b0 = b.
A’s advantage in wining the above game is defiined as
Adv IND-CPAA =| Pr[b = b0]  1/2 | .
Definition 2.21 (Unforgeability) A signcryption scheme is existentially unforge-
able against chosen-message attacks (EU-CMA) if no PPT adversary A has a non-
negligible advantage in the following game,
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Setup. S runs Setup(1 ) to output the public parameters params and sends them
to A.
KeyGen. S runs KeyGen(params) to output two pairs of secret and public key
(SKr, PKr) (SKs, PKs) and sends (PKs, PKr, params) to A.
Query. A adaptively query the signature oracle as in the confidentiality game.
Forgery. A outputs a message and signcryption pair (M⇤, SC⇤). A wins the game if
(M⇤, SC⇤) has not been queried before and Verify(params,M⇤, PK, SC⇤)! 1.
The A’s advantage in winning the above game is defined as
AdvEU-CMAA = Pr [1 Verify(DeSigncrypt(params, PKs, SKr, SC(M⇤)))] .
2.6 An overview of XACML
XACML is an OASIS standard language as a basis to provide a common security
policy language for di↵erent platforms and tools with pre-defined syntax and seman-
tics [OAS13]. It supports a flexible data management and access tool. Access was
defined by XACML standard as “performing an action” and access control defined
as “controlling access in accordance with a policy or policy-set”.
The policy model in XACML consists of three preliminary components; Policy-
set, Policy, Rule, as shown in Fig. 2.1. PolicySet components are associated with
Target, Policy and Policy Combining Algorithm (PCA). The PCA specifies the process
which the results of evaluating the policies are combined. Policy is also associated
with Target, Rule Combining Algorithm (RCA) and Rule. Rule consists of one or
multiple rules and is associated with Target, Condition and E↵ect. Rule in a policy
is the most primarily unit, which is encapsulated within policy. Rule indicates the
set of requests to which it applies, which is identified by Subject, Resource, Action,
Environment attributes, in the form of logic. The Condition element refines the
applicability of the target. The E↵ect of the rule identifies the intended consequence
of a rule, which consists of Permit and Deny. All these components are used to test
whether a request is applicable to the policy or not; can be specified in the condition
section.
Fig. 2.2 depicts the XACML data-flow with the main actors in the XACML
domain including: Context Handler, Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Deci-
sion Point (PDP), Policy Information Point (PIP) and Policy Administration Point
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Figure 2.1: XACML 3.0 Policy Language Model.
(PAP). PAP makes policies available to PDP when the access requester sends a
request to PEP to access the policies. Then, PEP sends the request to context
handler, and context handler forwards this request to PDP.
With respect to a particular decision request, PDP evaluates a policy-combining
algorithm (PCA) or rule-combining algorithm (RCA) and a set of policies, policy-
sets or rules. It returns a response context that specifies the authorisation decision
with Decision element of “Permit”, “Deny”, “Indeterminate” or “NotApplicable”
values.
Figure 2.2: XACML Data Flow Diagram.
Due to the need of attributes information, PDP sends the request to the context
handler, in which case context handler forwards this request to PIP. Next, the
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context handler sends the retrieved attributes in addition to resource attributes to
PDP. PDP then returns the response context to the context handler that translates it
to the native response format of the PEP. Finally, PEP fulfils the decisions, whether
it is deny or permit.
Chapter 3
Multi-Authority Security Framework for
Scalable EHR Systems
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems can be operated in a large-scale distributed
environment, such as cloud computing, which might have to be managed by multiple
authorities who control the access to patient records. Unfortunately, the security
of such systems is usually inadequate, which results in the hindrance of the EHR
systems adoption in practice. Attribute-based systems have been a popular choice
that could provide a flexible and reliable access control to EHR databases, which are
usually managed by a single authority, who is responsible for setting up the system’s
policy. In a large-scale distributed system, it might be necessary to have multiple
authorities, who can handle users located at di↵erent areas. Nevertheless, one of
the challenges is how to enable multiple authorities with a single access policy. In
this chapter, we provide a sound solution to this issue. Our EHR system provides a
secure environment for EHR users to use the system conveniently and provide the
flexibility and scalability.
3.1 Introduction
The Electronic Health Record Committee in the Health Information Management
Systems Society (HIMSS) defined EHR using this statement: “The Electronic Health
Record (EHR) is a secure, real-time, point-of-care, patient-centric information re-
source for clinicians. The EHR aids clinicians’ decision making by providing access
to patient health record information where and when they need it by incorporating
evidence-based decision support” [DL14]. The 2003 ISO/TS 18308 references the
IOM 1991 definition and CEN 13606 2000 to define an EHR system as “a system




EHR has numerous advantages for improving the quality of diagnosis and reduc-
ing the medical costs and errors in order to address reliable and e cient healthcare
processes. The exchange of health information is a crucial component to enable
provision of high-quality health services. Meanwhile, one of the key issues in elec-
tronic healthcare is to share patient records across enterprises. Healthcare providers
require to share and distribute EHR data among necessarily interested parties to
provide access to healthcare resources and achieve EHR advantages.
Deploying cloud services in the health sector can facilitate the exchange of med-
ical data among entities and act as the medical record storage but require some
certain level of protections [AK14]. In this regard, several regulations and stan-
dards such as HITECH Act, HIPAA, HL7 CDA, CEN 13606 EHRcom and openEHR
proposed guidelines and frameworks for sharing and exchanging health information
via digitally representation of clinical data between di↵erent entities across health-
care communities. In the following section, we outline some Health IT standards
proposed for healthcare data exchange and data sharing.
3.1.1 Health IT Standards
Health Level-7 (HL7) is an acceptable messaging standard that refers to a set of
flexible international standards, guidelines and methodologies for clinical and ad-
ministrative data exchange among software applications used by various healthcare
providers. These standards can ensure healthcare system interoperability and EHR
sharing or integration through a set of rules in a consistent process [HL7]. The
HL7 EHR system Functional model provides a reference list of functions described
from the user perspective, which may be present in an EHR System (EHRS) to
illustrate the granular aspects of functions. The function list designed to enable
consistent system functionality. EHRS model neither endorses the technology nor
includes the EHR data content but enables information exchange to support the
population of “clinical documents, event summaries, minimum data sets and claim
attachments”. The EHRS Functional Model is composed of a functional outline
(direct care, supportive, and information infrastructure) and a functional profile.
There are six rationales for including the function in the EHRS Functional Model,
which are: support delivery of e↵ective healthcare, improve patient safety, facilitate
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management of chronic conditions, improve e ciency, facilitate self-health manage-
ment, and ensure privacy and confidentiality. In terms of information infrastruc-
ture, EHRS includes seven sections as follows: EHR security; EHR information
and records management; unique identity; registry and directory services; support
for health informatics and terminology standards; interoperability; manage business
rules and workflow [DFH04, MTM+11, Spo07].
The Personally Controlled EHR (PCEHR) in Australia has adopted solutions
to establish an IT infrastructure for sharing health information. NEHTA applied
this to GP vendor systems implemented a standard profile to deliver a PCEHR
system across di↵erent locations with the application of IHE XDS [Aus12, Neh]. The
architectural model is based on a central registry that contains metadata of published
documents and an address pertaining to that specific document to facilitate the
discovery of documents. The architecture may include several distributed document
repositories that enable the document retrieval procedure [NR10]. The healthcare
enterprises cooperate for clinical document sharing is called “clinical a nity domain”
[DLAE07].
In the field of EHR, Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) specification,
developed by Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) addresses the needs for
registration, distribution and access to patient’s clinical information across health-
care enterprises under a document sharing governance structure agreed by all parties
involved. XDS provides an integration profile including a registry for querying pa-
tient records and methods for retrieving the documents. It employs structured EHR
standards such as Continuity of Care Record (CCR) and Clinical Data Architecture
(CDA) to facilitate data exchange. This has universally regarded as a method to
realise interoperable EHRs, although limited to the exchange of whole documents
without being able to analyse their contents. In order to facilitate the applica-
tion of XDS specification towards the use of ISO 13606, it enables an EHR_EXTRACT
to be stored within an XDS repository. The EHR_Extract is used to represent
health record information extracted from an EHRS provider and communicated to
an EHRS recipient, which contains attributes to identify the subject of care, health-
care provider, the subject’s EHR identifier and the agent responsible for creating
it.
IHE solely sets up the foundation for EHR interoperability amongst care do-
mains within single/multiple healthcare enterprises and addresses privacy and se-
curity controls through risk assessment and management. Privacy and security are
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enabled and enforced at di↵erent levels of depth as follows: policy, physical envi-
ronment, procedures, and organisational, departmental, functional and information
technology. It enables three distinct document sharing models, which are: direct
push, centralised discovery and retrieve and federated discovery and retrieve. IHE
recognises audit trail specifically centralised structure as the primary method of ac-
countability enforcement in the healthcare environment. IHE profile is Audit Trail
and Node Authentication (ATANA) that provides security and privacy controls,
which are: audit log, identification and authentication, data access control, secrecy,
data integrity, non-repudiation, patient privacy and availability controls. The se-
curity audit logs, network authentication and encryption for all communications of
patient data among trusted systems are established. Furthermore, systems can be
connected to each other, once the common policies are mandated, in order to provide
a chain of trust in XDS [SSB+12, RCO12].
The CEN/ISO 13606 Electronic Health Communication (EHRCOM) [CEN] is a
European norm from the European Committee for standardisation (CEN/TC251)
being designed to achieve semantic interoperability in the EHR communication. The
overall goal is to define “rigorous and stable information architecture for commu-
nicating part or all of the EHR” among EHR systems and centralised EHR data
repository. It can be harmonised with IHE XDS, and consequently XDS can store
and share 13606 EHR_Extract data. Nonetheless, it specifies neither the internal
architecture of an EHR system nor the way that data is stored. It also follows a
Dual Model architecture that defines an explicit separation between information and
knowledge through reference model and archetypes. The openEHR consortium pro-
vides the architecture to support distributed, patient-centered, life-long and shared
healthcare records. Archetype Definition Language (ADL) is a formal language de-
veloped by openEHR for expressing archetypes that adopted by CEN/ISO 13606
[MMM+12]. HL7 can be considered to be the foundation of integrated healthcare
environments with CEN/ISO 13606 standard [Beg07].
The ISO 22600: 2014 standard [22614] “defines principles and specifies services
needed for managing privileges and access control” to data and functions. This
standard is o↵ered in three parts, which are: overview and policy management, for-
mal models and implementations. The focus of this standard is on “communication
and use of healthcare data in distributed policy domains include healthcare data
sharing”. The ISO 22600-1 is intended to support their technical implementation
and also proposes a template with XML for the policy agreement. The structure
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includes: domain, policy, roles, directory, authentication and process elements. The
rules for the elements are stored in a repository as a part of structure and security
and privacy policy domains are distinguished by their policies. The policy ideally
should be harmonised and security standards defined at CEN and ISO ought to be
the primary tools for achieving this. Otherwise, for each role/ information/ action/
purpose, a set of policies has to be defined with security levels including rules and
equivalences between them. This standard is a generic construction of the system
including domains and authentication without functional security construction or
protocol. It uses cryptography to support digital signatures over a set of assigned
attributes. There is a policy ID attribute as references to policies in granularity
level and system hierarchy. As stated, any Attribute Authority (AA) can be de-
fined, however it has not specified the implementation.
British Medical Association (BMA) mentioned role-based systems to support re-
stricted access control lists, and in particular containing a single named clinician.
Moreover, clinicians must ensure that all record accesses are correctly attributable,
marked with the subject’s name, date and time. They set out a security policy based
on the rules defined by BMA as the following principles: access control lists, record
opening, control, consent and notification, persistence, attribution, information flow,
aggregation control, trusted computing-based [And96]. As stated in [And08] central
access control policies are appropriate to data-oriented protection systems. There-
fore, access control lists are not appropriate when the number of users is large and
changing continuously, or where users want to delegate their authority to other users
in order to perform specified functions.
Although several Health IT standards have mandated for data sharing, there are
still non-standardised communication architectures and models, which have caused
semantic divergences. Since healthcare environment is a broad domain with di↵erent
sub-domains, and a huge number of users, it needs to provide security, interoperabil-
ity and scalability to share and access EHR data. Accordingly, healthcare providers
are responsible for protecting their data to ensure proper access controls are in
place. In this chapter, we explore existing studies and introduce a security frame-
work, where the EHR system is managed by multiple authorities, along with a set of
protocols for the implementation of the framework. In accordance with the recent
development of data sharing, we notice that Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) can
be well fitted into our scenario thanks to its excellent structure which suits well to
our framework.
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The notion of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) was introduced by Sahai and
Waters as a solution to enable fine-grained access control for encrypted data [SW05].
The beauty of ABE is that the fine-grained access control is achieved through
some cryptographic techniques rather than traditional access control mechanisms.
[PTMW10] demonstrated that the ABE system is an e cient solution for securely
managing data in large distributed and loosely-coupled systems with the HIPAA
compliant distributed file system. Moreover, Ciphertext Policy ABE (CP-ABE)
was proposed by [BSW07] to provide complex access control on encrypted data and
to keep data confidential even if the storage server is untrusted. This is achieved
by embedding the policy in the ciphertexts directly. The main drawback of the
ABE system is the basic requirement that needs to have a central authority. Sub-
sequently, [LW11] addressed this issue by proposing a decentralised ABE, which
allows multiple authorities to share the same set of attribute policies. This work
has enabled new emerging applications of, the large-scale distributed systems, such
as cloud computing.
In this work, we enhance this direction of research by proposing a secure and
privacy preserved EHR system framework to control the access to EHR data. To
illustrate our idea, we incorporate scheme due to [LW11] into our proposed frame-
work to enable such a system. Specifically, we adopt the multi-authority system
to our framework to guarantee its practicality. Our EHR system ensures security
and scalability features in a distributed environment such as cloud computing. We
present the details of EHR data access control using attribute-based cryptography
and concerning the secure communication channel between EHR system users and
multiple authorities.
3.1.2 Related Work
In the following, we present a review of related work on security and privacy in EHR
systems. To start, we highlight the following properties which have been proposed
in some of the review studies as follows.
- Flexibility: The data access policies and access structure should be flexible to
provide e cient EHR data access, especially in emergencies.
- Scalability: The EHR system should be scalable to provide accessibility for
users from public domain/cloud other than the private domain/cloud. The
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EHR system scalability could be in terms of key management, storage, access
structure, computation and communication.
- Confidentiality: Unauthorised users should be prevented from accessing or de-
crypting EHR data by proper security implementation, including access control
and cryptographic techniques.
- Sharing: The EHR system model should be designed in a way that can share
any part of EHR with proper authorisation.
[BHMZ13] proposed an Electronic Transfer of Prescription (ETP) based on
National eHealth Transition Authority (NEHTA) with Unified Markup Language
(UML). The framework is based on using RM-ODP standards to provide guidelines
and support electronic Health systems at Australia’s national level. Their ETP
system architecture was proposed for Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model with
credentialing and enrollment functions. Moreover, their interoperable framework
facilitates information sharing and NEHTA outcomes’ consistency.
[ARR12] proposed a cloud-based EHR system, which consists of the cloud-based
data storage and computing resources, health providers (users), and Attribute Au-
thority (AA). Healthcare providers obtain their private keys from AA to login onto
the system with their username and password, and then can encrypt and decrypt
EHRs locally through installing lightweight software, and generating access policy
using the access policy engine. AA generates the public key and master private key
with the setup algorithm and generates a secret key associated with user’s attributes
when the new healthcare provider joins the system during the key generation algo-
rithm. In this work, one single AA is responsible for key management including
generation, distribution, and revocation in the EHR system. They considered a
CP-ABE scheme and organised EHR to the labeled hierarchical data structure to
provide flexibility, scalability and fine-grained access control.
In [WHZ13], Private Key Generator (PKG) service for key generation computes
the private key of the user which is being used to recover encrypted key for encrypt-
ing/decrypting the PHR dataset. Whenever a user wants to retrieve the EHR data
set from the cloud, first logs into the cloud server and after passing the authenti-
cation flow initiated by the Trusted Third Party (TTP), the server can obtain a
private key from PKG to recover the encrypted key. Moreover, after decryption, the
TTP transmits the symmetric key to Patient Health Record (PHR) cloud service to
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perform key verification and decryption of PHR dataset body. EHR trusted server
serves as the root PKG for encrypting EHRs and generating private/decryption keys
for EHR owners, domain servers and entities.
The work [BLLS11] in the ESPAC framework (patient-centric access control
scheme for e-health in cloud) designed an access control structure which electronic
healthcare provider works as a trusted party to do the registration process to gen-
erate the keys, and trusted authority assigns unique ID to the healthcare provider.
[ZLHL11] proposed an EHR security model with Role-Based and Time-Based Access
Control model (RBTBAC) with one Trusted Authority (TA) to provide flexibility.
TA contains two parts for encrypting EHR data and enforcing predefined access
control policies.
Some studies have aimed to implement cryptographic techniques such as ABE
schemes to provide security and privacy of EHR data. [XLZ+15] designed a secure
cloud-based EHR system with ABE for e cient storing and sharing PHRs where
they applied global authority in the EHR system, responsible for key management,
generates keys for physicians, and publishes public parameters for cryptographic
operations. In this work, the global authority issues private keys to physicians for
retrieving PHRs from the cloud server, so it has all information about users’ secret
keys. In another study, [XWC+14] proposed a PHR service system to provide the
e cient searching, fine-grained access control, and PHR data sharing with anony-
mous ABE in the hybrid cloud environment. The TA generates a private key for
users and public cloud stores the PHR. There is also a private cloud to facilitate
users’ secure usage.
The work in [LBL+12] proposed attribute-oriented authentication and transmis-
sion schemes for secure and privacy-preserving health information sharing in health
social networks (HSNs). The attribute-oriented transmission scheme enables an HSN
user to encrypt the health data associated with access policy which was specified
with the set of attributes. The network model shows an attribute trust authority
(ATA) to assigning the attribute set and keys.
[HSH12] proposed an EHR data sharing framework that combines Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE) and ABE to enforce access control policies and scalable access
between di↵erent clouds. The domain servers are serving as authorities to enforce
access policies and reduce the computation overhead. Then, the trusted server
generates and distributes keys to domain servers as a root PKG.
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The work in [LYZ+13] presented an ABE-based patient-centric, secure and scal-
able PHR sharing framework with the security mechanisms for cloud-based PHRs
in semi-trusted servers. They applied a combination of [CC09] and [YWRL10] MA-
ABE schemes from KP-ABE in which data owners are TA of their data to manage
the keys and access rights. The work in [YWRL10] proposed the secure, scalable and
fine-grained data access control in the cloud with KP-ABE, proxy re-encryption and
lazy re-encryption. In this proposed scheme, the data owner can define the flexible
access structure for system users. The work in [IRC12] designed an access control
with KP-ABE for e-health systems. There is one TA to generate the encryption
and decryption keys. This work also follows a single authority implementation to
distribute keys to the users. They provide scalable and simplified key management
in their scheme.
The work in [YJRZ13] designed an attribute-based access control for multi-
authority systems in cloud storage, whereas there is a globally trusted Certificate
Authority (CA) to set-up the system, register all the users and AAs, and assign
global user identifier and authority identifier for each authority. A seminal study
in this area is the work of [YJ12] that proposed scalable data access control for
multiple authority cloud storage systems. While they mentioned their scheme does
not require any global authority for key management, there is one CA as globally
trusted certificate authority. CA sets up the system and accepts the registration
of users and AAs in the system. The CA has the power to assign global identities
to users and generate global secret/public key pairs. In [WLL12a] PHR CP-ABE
platform, one AA administrates the secret keys based on Waters CP-ABE scheme.
The work in [BCHL09] presented a Patient Controlled Encryption (PCE) system
to enable patients to share their partial access rights with others. They aimed to
guarantee e cient access, easy sharing and e cient searching over records. Here,
patients need to verify healthcare provider’s credentials for issuing keys as trusted
parties. [NGS10] proposed a privacy-preserving EHR system with ABE infrastruc-
ture to share patients’ data among healthcare providers in a flexible and scalable
manner. They applied one TA to generate the private key and a public directory
to store public values of the system. To add searchability feature, they combined
broadcast CP-ABE with a searchable scheme and a secure channel free Public-Key
Encryption (PKE) with keyword search. Moreover, they used flexible protocol for
keyword search functionality and ABE for flexible policies. They concluded that
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attribute-based cryptographic primitives can provide flexible policies to build se-
cure EHR system infrastructures.
In some proposals [ARR12, And08, CLC+12], the healthcare provider can out-
source EHR data and patients can specify access policies in agreement with the
TA or healthcare provider. TA is an abstract entity, which is formed by all EHR
authorities. TA is responsible for key distribution and issuing credentials of a pa-
tient’s PHR. TA is considered as the center to build the access control structure
of communication among system users and EHR systems [CLC+12]. In [ZLHL11],
TAs are responsible for EHR data encryption from EHR providers into ciphertext
format and access control which enforces pre-determined access control policies with
a remote EHR database to store the encrypted EHR data.
Although all the studies reviewed so far have attempted to provide security
of EHR data, they su↵er from the fact that one central TA could lead to a large
computation overhead through the system expansion. Moreover, users have di↵erent
attributes associated with their data which cannot be handled with one single TA
in a distributed environment. Notably, when there is one single TA who issues all
the secret keys then undoubtedly it has the power to access to all EHR data in the
system.
In a follow-up study [Cha07], the multi-authority scheme was presented to sup-
port di↵erent attribute authorities issuing secret keys to the users for the di↵erent
set of attributes. Chase improved this idea in another work by removing the trusted
central authority which could monitor all the users’ attributes and issues all the
decryption keys to the system users. The work in [CC09] proposed multi-authority
attribute-based encryption that enables realistic deployment of attribute based ac-
cess control where di↵erent attribute authorities issue di↵erent set of attributes. In
another study, a decentralised CP-ABE scheme [LW11] was proposed to remove the
global coordination of the authorities except the initial setup for common reference
parameters and some limitations in access policies of Chase’s scheme. Implementa-
tion of decentralised CP-ABE can reduce key distribution and attribute management
overhead on one single TA of the proposed EHR system models.
We provide a summary of previous works and our work in Table 3.1. We believe
that our framework moves one step forward by introducing CP-ABE with multi-
authority. In comparison to other multi-authority systems, we allow authorities
to share the same policy base and issue private keys independently. In Table 3.1,
we present a comparison of our framework and other proposed EHR systems. The
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Table 3.1: Properties of the related work and our framework.
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merit of our approach is about its feature of distributed management, which prevents
“single points of failure”. That is, if there is a failure in a TA, other TAs can help
and make sure the system functions as normal. The accountability can be secured
by the separate private key held by TAs. Any action from a TA is associated with its
private key, which ensures the responsibility and accountability of the corresponding
TA. Again, this feature has been embedded in the original CP-IBE scheme.
The remainder of this chapter organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents a model,
where we describe our framework. Section 3.3 defines the attribute encryption sys-
tem for our framework. Section 3.4 presents the detailed security protocols. Section
3.5 describes a practical application scenario to further illustrate our framework.
Section 3.6 is the conclusion.
3.2 Model
We design our model, by making it be as close to Electronic Transfer of Prescription
(ETP) as possible. As stated in e-Government Strategy by Australian Government
[AGI06], in addition to protecting security and privacy as the users’ requirements,
it is preferred to reform the poorly designed and redundant processes, and reduce
the duplication by standardising and combining similar processes across agencies.
Moreover, [BHMZ13] stated that the ETP system model could be quite complex
to demonstrate if the same provider participates in other communities. The ETP
architecture can be tailored to the EHR system needs resulting in di↵erent solution
aspects with di↵erent requirements such as security and privacy [BCHL09]. The
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ETP system could be improved in a consistent, flexible, scalable and interoperable
framework with our solution.
Figure 3.1: System model.
We propose our EHR system model with the decentralised CP-ABE scenario
introduced by [LW11]. The model is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The main design goal
of our system is to enable di↵erent EHR system users having access to EHR data
conveniently in distributed environments, such as cloud and enhance privacy and
security. The principal users are expected to be authorised healthcare providers,
the patient or subject of care who have access to certain functions to their EHR.
The healthcare provider receives appropriate decision support to enable e↵ective
electronic communication between providers, and between the provider and patient
or caregiver.
Whereas there is no standard architecture for EHR systems, we provide a basic
model for hospital-based EHR system, including physician, patient, etc. There are
di↵erent types of data: clinical data, medical and nursing diagnoses, laboratory test
results, etc. The EHR database is located in cloud-storage in encrypted form. The
system users outsource and retrieve EHR data from EHR cloud-storage. There are
multi-authorities who share an attribute policy base. Patient data are encrypted
with proper attributes by any of authorities. The authorities, who manage the
system, can reside at di↵erent locations according to the need. A user can access
patient records, according to his/her private encryption key, associated with proper
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attributes.
The ETP is a solution specification developed to facilitate interoperability con-
cerned with transferring electronic clinical documents between prescribers and dis-
pensers. The participants in ETP are: subject, prescriber/ organization, dispenser/
organization, Prescription Exchange Service (PES), subject agent, medications sup-
ply manager. This architecture includes issuing authority, registration authority,
policy authority, and governance authority for credentialing identities in ETP. The
identity system applied is based on the PKI model where enrollment and credential-
ing are separate functions. On the other hand, as mentioned by [And08] public key
certificates are considered to be “crypto” rather than “access control” where their
implications for access control policies and architectures are not thought through.
In our system, we enable a set of access control policy through di↵erent authorities
to enable heterogeneous access levels. In this set of policy, we can partition users
and resources into domains with distinct administrators, and trust can be inherited
between domains (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Trust Relationship Diagram.
Our system depicts all the participants in a sound comprehensive and generic
communication including healthcare provider (hospital or individual providers) and
subject (patient). The individual providers can be doctors and physicians while not
any third party such as supply manager is involved in the system, however, it can
be registered by authorities. The authorities are set-up to perform the enrollment.
There are not any credentialing functions owing to replacing certificate authorities
3.2. Model 41
by attribute authorities. The access policy is embedded in the attributes which
removes the policy authority or any policy management party. We improve privacy
by removing the direct access to patient records by the dispenser, supply manager
and prescriber. Any other user than healthcare provider and patient itself needs to
be registered by multi-authorities to gain access to patient data (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Data Flow Diagram.
Our model is based on decentralised CP-ABE, which is not based on PKI. The
benefit of multi-authority is to enable distributed systems and increase the scalability
feature by removing the need to CA. Our system provides a rich access control
approach to handling complex EHR systems. Our aim is to provide an alternative
approach to handling the EHR systems in distributed systems. Avoiding centralised
EHR is one of the goals. Our system provides a novel approach for decentralised
design. Since it is not based on PKI, our system provides more flexibility to handle
access control of EHR. PKI is only applied as part of SSL, which solely provides an
authenticated secure channel for data flows (Figure 3.3).
The trust model can be centralised, distributed or federated. Our system model
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o↵ers distributed trust model with providing Multi-Attribute Authorities. In ac-
cordance with the centralised model, any single point of failure makes a major
bottleneck at the central trust, and consequently the system cannot perform. We
resolve this issue with Multi-Attribute Authorities implementation. As shown in
Figure 3.3, there is a peer-to-peer trust relationship in a distributed model. The
direct communication, highlighted by arrows, occurs only between trusted parties
who are patient, physician, healthcare provider, patient record server and trusted
authorities. The cloud server is an honest-but-curious party, and only provides the
required data storage.
3.3 ATTRIBUTE-BASED SECURITY FRAME-
WORK WITH MULTIPLE TRUST AUTHOR-
ITIES
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) firstly was introduced by [SW05] where they
constructed an Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) of a message under attributes to
create a fuzzy identity. There are two forms of ABE presented by [GPSW06, BSW07]
namely Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) and Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE). In CP-ABE system, keys are associated
with the sets of attributes and ciphertexts are associated with the access policies.
Then, the user who has the private key which satisfies the policy can decrypt the
ciphertext. In the KP-ABE system, private keys are associated with an access struc-
ture and the ciphertext is labeled with a set of attributes. Then, when the access
structure defined in the private keys matches the attributes labeled with the cipher-
text, a user can decrypt the ciphertext. In our system, policies are controlled by
the health authority such as the hospital as the healthcare provider. Private/public
keys are associated with the sets of attributes (CP-ABE). Our system is based on
the original security model of CP-IBE, which illuminates all the potential attacks
aiming to compromise the system. These attacks may include: collusion attacks,
chosen plaintext attacks (or symmetric security), etc. As demonstrated by Bethen-
court [BSW07], CP-ABE is secure against collusion attacks.
Definition 3.1 (Trusted Authority) Let T = {TAi} for i = 1, · · · , n, a set of n
parties, who are fully trusted by all other parties for correctly setting up the system
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and issuing correct private keys to other parties. They share the same set of policy
base that consists of a set of attributes. Any trusted authority TAi 2 T can issue a
private decryption key to a user in the system.
Definition 3.2 (Access Matrix) Let A be an n ⇥ l access matrix and maps to its
rows to attributes {ai}, for n ⇥ l, be a set of attributes. Any ai 2 A represents an
element used to define the access policy to patient records.
Following the multi-authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption sys-
tem by [LW11], our proposed EHR system is comprised of the following five algo-
rithms:
• Global-Setup. This algorithm takes as input the security parameter k and
outputs global parameters GP for the system.
• TA-Setup (GP )! SK,PK. Each TAi runs the algorithm with GP as input
from the Global-Setup phase to produce its own private key (SK) and public
key (PK).
• Encrypt(M, (A, ⇢), GP, {PK}) ! C. The encryption algorithm takes in a
message M , an access matrix (A, ⇢), the set of public keys for relevant TAs,
and the global parameters GP . It outputs a ciphertext C.
• KeyGen(GID,GP, i, SK)! Ki, GID. It takes as input a global identity GID
(in our EHR system, it represents a user ID), the global parameters, and an
attribute i belonging to some TA, and the private key SK for this TA. It
produces a key Ki, GID for this attribute and identity pair.
• Decrypt(C,GP,Ki, GID)!M . The decryption algorithm takes in the global
parameters GP , the ciphertext C, and a collection of keys corresponding to
attribute, identity pairs all with the same fixed identity GID. It outputs either
the message M when the collection of attributes i satisfies the access matrix
corresponding to the ciphertext. Otherwise, decryption fails.
3.4 THE PROTOCOLS
We have assumed that our EHR has a set of trusted authorities T , where TAi 2 T
is an abstract entity, which could be a mix of health authorities and hospitals that
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control the access control policies in order to provide trusted services. For simplicity,
we assume that our EHR system consists of a set of TAs, a set of patients who have
full access rights to their own records, a set of physicians who have some or all access
rights granted by a TA to their patient records.
Definition 3.3 (Patient records) Let Rx be a set of patient records wrt patient x.
Any element ri 2 Rx for i = 1, · · · , np is encrypted with attribute-based encryption
using a di↵erent or the same {PK} depending on the access policy. By r̄i we denote
the encrypted record of ri. Each record is assigned a number or an ID, such as idr
i
for record ri.
In Table 3.2, as an example, we assume that all patient records are encrypted
with the attributed-based encryption algorithm defined earlier. We assume that
each item in a patient record is encrypted with a set of attributes, where they may
be di↵erent or the same for di↵erent records, depending on the access policy. In our
scenario, attributes are defined as access rights such as “read”, “write”, “delete”,
etc. In light of this, there is no need to know the patient’s records for assigning an
access privilege to the user.
Table 3.2: The format of patient records.
Patient Information Attributes EHR
Patient ID Record ID a1 a2 a3 · · · an r̄i
Alice idr1 1 0 1 · · · 1 r̄1
idr2 1 0 1 · · · 0 r̄2











0 0 1 · · · 1 r̄n
p
Bob idr1 0 1 0 · · · 0 r̄1








It can be seen from the data in Table 3.2 that all access privileges are associated
with unique patient ID, therefore, they cannot be misused. There are record ID
associated with EHR data for users, which are unique and enable EHR encryption.
ID is unique to a patient. The attributes embedded in the access key of a user
are associated with the unique ID, which avoids any potential collusion. Every
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user is registered by a TA who assigns proper attributes to the user. “Null” in
Table 3.2 represents that patient does not have any specific access right to EHR
data. Consequently, the uniqueness of a private key can represent the appropriate
access. Accordingly, a user can decrypt the record if his key contains the authorised
attributes associated with the correct ID.
In Table 3.3, we provide a summary of participants in our protocols.
Table 3.3: Access arrangement. Where Patient Record Server could be TA
Party involoved Access rights
TA’s Grant access rights
Patient Read his/her own records only
Physician/doctor Read access and/or append new patient records
Patient record server Encrypt patient records
Cloud server Null
In the following, we provide the precise definition of the entities involved in the
system.
Definition 3.4 (Entities Involved)
Patient. A patient P is the full owner of its own patient record and has the full trust
to the set of TAs (Figure 3.3) to correctly manage its record and grant correctly access
rights to a physician. Patients have only the “read” right to their own electronic
health records.
Physician. A physician or medical specialist D’s access rights to the patient records
are granted by a TA 2 T . With its access rights to some or all records, D can
read these records and append new information to these records but cannot delete
any patient record (item). Physicians must show that they are “meaningfully using”
certified EHRs by meeting certain objectives.
Patient Record Server. Let S be a patient record server, who is responsible to manage
patient records. S is a trusted server, who manages and updates patient records
according to the access policy. As an important task for S, it encrypts patient records
with the correct public key (attributes).
Notice that Patient Record Server is not the cloud server, but an authorised
server by the health authority. A summary of access arrangement of involved parties
is given in Table 3.3.
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3.4.1 EHR System Setup
The trusted authorities in T bear the full responsibility to set the EHR system
up by firstly using Global-Setup. Upon the completion of Global-Setup, the global
parameters GP are used to construct the cryptographic keys of TAs by using TA-
Setup. As a result of TA-Setup, each TAi for i = 1, · · · , n in T holds a private key
SK and a public key PK.
3.4.2 Registration
In the registration phase, each user needs to communicate with a trusted authority
(TAi) in order to obtain its own private key which we denote as Ki, and is generated
in terms of the attribute-based policy. Since all trusted authorities share a policy
base, any trusted authority can issue a legal key to a user. Suppose that in the
initiation phase, an SSL channel is established and all communication flows hereafter
are protected. Note that SSL only provides a secure channel for communication as
a standard system setup and is not managed by TA. We omit this phase in the
following protocols.
Patient (P) Registration:
1. P ! TAi: P , REQP .
2. TAi ! P : KP .
Here, REQP is a request from P for registration to TAi and KP is the private key for
P to access its own EHR records. KP is generated by calling the KeyGen algorithm.
The KeyGen algorithm takes ID of P, global parameters GID from TAi global-setup,
and attributes of TAi with private key K for TAi to output KP of P .
Physician/Doctor (D) Registration:




, · · · ).





, · · · ) is a request from D to obtain private decryption keys




, · · · 2 RP . KD,P is the private key for




, · · · . KD,P is generated by calling
the KeyGen algorithm. The KeyGen algorithm takes ID of D, global parameters
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GID from TAi global-setup, and attributes of TAi with private key SK for TAi to
output KD,P of D.
Record Server (S) Registration:
1. S ! TAi : S,REQS.
2. TAi ! S : PK.
S receives PK from TAi, which include all required parameters for encryption of
patient records from TAi. S can encrypt a record on request of a physician or a
patient, according to the attribute-based policy by the Encrypt algorithm.
3.4.3 Patient Record Management
Patient Record (Item) Creation:
Creation of a patient record could be done when a patient visits its physician.
Optionally, it could be done remotely while the patient consults a physician by a
computer network. We assume that the creation of a patient record requires the
authorisation of the patient.
1. D ! S : EPK(P, r).
2. S encrypts and stores it as (P, idr
i
, {ai}, r̄i).
D generates a record item ri for Patient P . {ai} 2 A is a set of attributes, which
have been used for the encryption. The patient records stored in the cloud follow the
format given in Table 3.2. The encryption is performed with the Encrypt algorithm.
The encryption algorithm takes ri, with record’s ID idr
i
, GP of global-setup, and PK
of TAi, then outputs ciphertext r̄i and stores as (P, idr
i
, {ai}, r̄i) in cloud-storage.
Reading Patient Record:
We assume that the protocol is executed between a user U (patient or physician)
and S.
1. U ! S : P, idr
i
.
2. S ! U : r̄i.
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U , who can be the patient or a physician, requests patient record ri to S. S finds the
encrypted record r̄i according to idr
i
provided by U . Upon receiving r̄i, U decrypts
it with its private key to P : KU,P . The Decrypt algorithm takes ciphertext r̄i , GP
of global-setup, and private key KU,P , then outputs decrypted record of ri.
Inserting (Update) to A Patient Record (Item):
This protocol is executed between a physician D and S.
1. D ! S : P, idr
i
.
2. S ! D : r̄i.
3. D ! S : EPK(P, r0i).
4. S encrypts and stores it as (P, idr0
i
, {ai}, r0i).
Here, r0i is the updated record wrt ri. This operation is actually “appending”, where








In the setup stage, a proper SSL session is required to provide a secure and au-
thenticated channel, which ensures that all later communication flows are encrypted
and all users know that their communication partners are genuine. This process
can be easily built into the system, as the SSL can be implemented easily. SSL is
merely used for securing the communication channel and plays no role in our access
control structure. It can be set up when HTTPS is installed as all other web-based
systems. Our protocols only address the access control part. TAs do not require
handling SSL connections.
The patient records are all encrypted with proper attributes. Consequently, only
the authorised parties can access these records. It is assumed that the cloud server
is managed the health authorities who, along with TAs, are trusted by the patients.
The cloud server is not authorised to write and update patient records, even though
they are trusted to encrypt patient records as an option mentioned earlier. Once a
patient record is updated, it must be re-encrypted with the same set of attributes,
according to the policy. Once it is encrypted, the cloud server is unable to decrypt.
Global-Setup and TA-Setup are two important algorithms which allow the au-
thorities to run the system. This process is again protected with an SSL session
if the communication is required. All late protocols are based on the parameters
produced from Global-Setup and TA-Setup.
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The patient’s keys are issued by TAs while we have assumed that TAs have ob-
tained these private keys. Hence, they can access all patients’ records. Nevertheless,
this is a necessary assumption in order to run the system.
3.5 AN APPLICATION SCENARIO
All patients who receive the treatment in the healthcare system (clinic, hospital,
laboratory, etc) must be registered. The authorities, who are in charge of the system
act as TAs, are located at di↵erent locations. To take one example, there is an
authority for each town or suburb. We assume that each patient holds a valid
health card (smart card) as, which holds some basic information about the patient,
including the private cryptographic keys to access its health record stored in the
cloud server. Each patient must be registered with one of the authorities, who issues
all information required to use the healthcare system. This information including
patient name, address, gender, cryptographic keys, etc. Therefore, patients based
on their associated attributes can decrypt their data with their own private key
(smart card).
In the registration process, patients are given a unique ID (such as Social Security
Number or tax number) and password by a local TA to request for a private key
from TA which grants access to their own EHR records (if it is not empty). With its
key, a patient has full access rights and is able to modify some of its records, such
as allergies or new medications is taking with its own private key, but cannot delete
any existing record. Take Alice in Table 3.2 as an example. Her cryptographic key
should include the attributes for all her health records of (idr1 , · · · , idrnp).
Medical sta↵ should be registered and authorised health card (a smart card) is
issued to each sta↵. The smart card contains all his/her patients access keys which
can be granted at the registration and updated in the future while a new patient is
included and an old patient has left.
A physician should be able to access his/her patients records by defined access
policies and with the private key from a TA, read and update the patients’ records
in cloud server. Again, no one can delete any record in the system.
If a patient visits a physician in a clinic due to a splinter in thumb, to access
the patient history (leg, splinter, etc.), firstly, if not yet registered, the physician
should register in an online TA to get its own private key. Physician thereupon can
decrypt patient data and access the patient’s medical records from server such as
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vaccination, principal diagnosis, insurance, identity, etc. If the finger appears to be
infected then the physician needs to assign a blood test or extended reviews. The
authorised key of the physician should be able to access the future records of the
patient.
Taking Table 3.4 as an example, Alice’s physician, Mike holds a key which con-
tains the attributes to access (idr2 , idr3); therefore, he can access (r2, r3) only, but
no other records. Mike should hold a table, which contains all his patients’ access
information. An example is given in Table 3.4, which shows that he can access
Alice’s EHR (r2, r3) with key akr2r3 and Bob’s EHR r2 with key bkr2 .
Table 3.4: The access table for Mike.
Patient Information Attributes
Patient ID Record ID a1 a2 a3 · · · an Key
Alice idr2 1 0 1 · · · 0 akr2r3
idr3 0 0 1 · · · 0
Bob idr2 0 1 0 · · · 1 bkr2
3.6 CONCLUSION
We have proposed and described an EHR system model which can provide scalability
and flexibility of EHR systems in distributed environments while preserving privacy
and security of EHR data. We investigated one of the solutions to the security
and privacy issues on distributed EHR systems, which avoids using a single trusted
authority. With ABE, we can provide fine-grained access control and flexible policies
for secure EHR system infrastructures. We plan to develop our EHR system model in
more details and with the exchange platforms such as HL7. Although our proposed
system meets our design requirements, it is worth noting that some potential issues
about the proposed system. Like all systems, which require security protection, the
potential computational cost should be considered in future implementation. We
assume that TAs and S have powerful computers, which can handle the additional
computation overheads owing to the computation of encryption. Consequently, we
proposed that TAs and S carry out most of the computations while users only
require decrypting the corresponding patient’s records. This kind of computation
can be easily conducted on a normal PC or even a smart phone. The other issue
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we should consider is the coordination in implementation. By virtue of the nature
of distributed systems, the policy updates should be managed by the authorised




Sharing with Dynamic Access Control
Policy Transformation
Data sharing in Electronic Health Record systems (EHRs) is important for im-
proving the quality of healthcare delivery. Data sharing, however, has raised some
security and privacy concerns because healthcare data could be potentially accessi-
ble by a variety of users, which could lead to privacy exposure of patients. Without
addressing this issue, large-scale adoption and sharing of EHR data are impracti-
cal. The traditional solution to the problem is via encryption. Although encryption
can be applied to access control, it is not applicable for complex EHR systems that
require multiple domains (e.g. public and private clouds) with various access re-
quirements. This chapter addresses the security and privacy issues of EHR data
sharing with our novel access control mechanism, which captures the scenario of
the hybrid cloud and need of access control policy transformation, to provide secure
and privacy-preserving data sharing among di↵erent healthcare enterprises. We in-
troduce an access control mechanism with some cryptographic building blocks and
present a novel approach for secure EHR data sharing and access control policy
transformation in EHR systems for hybrid clouds. We propose a useful data sharing
system for healthcare providers to handle various EHR users who have various access
privileges in di↵erent cloud environments. A systematic study has been conducted





Cloud-based platforms are desirable for delivering electronic health services with
ubiquitous network access, scalability and cost saving [SMM14]. Transferring elec-
tronic health records (EHRs) to the cloud poses major threats to privacy, data
integrity and confidentiality. As a result, several regulations and standards such
as the HITECH Act, HIPAA, HL7 CDA, CEN 13606, ISO 22600 EHRcom, IHE
XDS and openEHR proposed guidelines and frameworks for sharing and exchang-
ing health information via digital representations of clinical data. However, there
are numerous non-standardised communication architectures that have caused se-
mantic divergences. This case reveals that healthcare providers are responsible for
protecting their data to ensure that proper access controls are in place [RWS15].
With the growing popularity of cloud computing, EHR data can be stored in
the cloud and shared among authorised parties. By using cryptography, secure data
sharing can be achieved because encryption can provide a simple form of access
control. However, data sharing increases the complexity of key distribution and
policy specification of access control. Multi-user settings in the cloud pose challenges
to providing an e cient and secure access control mechanism [CLC+12]. Shared data
may include patient sensitive and personal information, such as chronic diseases,
mental health issues, psychiatric care, sexual behaviour, fertility issues, abortion
status and HIV status, which demand privacy preserving implementations. Indeed,
encryption as a common practice can provide some basic access control against
unauthorised access to private EHR data.
Large EHRs are usually handled by distributed computing systems, such as cloud
computing systems. Recently, a large number of papers about EHR access control
with Attributed-Based Encryption (ABE) were published. With ABE, one conve-
niently manages fine-grained access control in the EHR. This has been seen as a
promising approach for cloud-based EHR systems. However, in a practical applica-
tion, EHR data could be stored in multiple clouds due to the need for scalability
and privacy. This aspect of EHR systems has not been investigated.
In this chapter, we propose a secure EHR system architecture for secure data
sharing, based on several cryptographic building blocks and secret sharing, with
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to protect patients’ privacy. To better manage
the system, we require data to be stored in di↵erent types of clouds, i.e. a public
cloud and a private cloud. EHRs stored in the private cloud can only be accessed
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by the authorised medical professionals, whereas those in the public cloud can be
used by medical researchers, pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, public
health agencies, commercial or government agencies, etc. Each cloud requires a
RBAC policy that is based on a special type of ABPRE, namely Attribute-Based
Proxy Re-encryption. Electronic health record system data sharing is based on
the technology of threshold encryption. We consider a practical scenario where an
EHR’s data can only be accessed while a threshold number of authorised parties
are present. It is usually called threshold secret-sharing. This scenario has been
outlined in the literature [Sha79].
We provide an approach for policy transformation for transferring private-cloud
policies to the public cloud while encrypted data is transferred. This is necessary
when private data must be accessed by di↵erent parties. Our hierarchical access
structure grants access to authorised users and limits access rights to other users
in the public domain. To the best of our knowledge, our approach has not been
proposed previously.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the
related work in EHR systems. Section 4.3 introduces our EHR data sharing system
scenario, our proposed architecture, the relevant security definitions and our pro-
posed access control policy scheme. Section 4.4 presents an application instance of
our proposed access control scheme. Section 4.5 presents the discussion and remarks.
Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Related Work
A large body of literature has investigated the issue of data sharing in cloud com-
puting. We summarise them here.
The work of Wu et al. [WAH12] proposed an access control mechanism to support
selective sharing of composite EHR data from multiple healthcare providers and
preserve patient privacy.
In a study that set out to provide patient privacy and accountability in the
health information sharing environment, Ahmed et al. [AAJ14] suggested sharing
provenance, which is implementable to the open source CONNECT software to en-
able eHealth Exchange specifications. Nevertheless, their studies lack the thorough
representation of dynamic access control policy solutions.
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In another study, Basu et al. [BKL+12] presented Fusion Architecture, an ex-
perimental cloud-based platform for securely managing and sharing healthcare in-
formation at large scale, however, the access structure to clarify data sharing man-
agement and the granting of access by di↵erent parties were not presented. Mohan
et al. [MBB+09] proposed MedVault as a patient-centric framework for EHR data
sharing in which a source-verifiable health record repository evaluates the requests
based on the patient’s policy and attributes. Nonetheless, the solution considered
neither cloud computing nor policy transformation.
Similarly, Zhang and Liu [ZL10] proposed a security model for sharing and in-
tegration of EHR data in the cloud. Encryption and access control were used in
the storage server for EHR management with hierarchical and time-bound key man-
agement terms. In further studies, [LYZ+13, HMF+13, DYL+14, Hur13] proposed
solutions for privacy-preserving data sharing based on ABE or CP-ABE in the cloud
to encrypt data and to provide the hierarchical access structure for fine-grained data
sharing. They did not provide policy dynamics as in our proposed scheme.
One of the challenges of data sharing is key management. Yu et al. [YWRL10]
pointed out data security and access control issues in the EHR sharing within the
public domain owing to the heavy computation overhead in key distribution and
data management, which occurs in applying fine-grained access control. They used
Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE), Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE), and lazy re-encryption
in order to define and enforce access control policies, but secure and dynamic access
rights are demanding.
In the same vein, Wei et al. [WLS14] demonstrated a data-sharing system, in
which the data holder encrypts data with the public key and then uploads it to
the cloud servers, regardless of various access requirements. Furthermore, Chu et
al. [CCT+14] proposed a public-key encryption scheme that produces constant-size
ciphertexts for e cient delegation of decryption rights in the cloud data sharing in a
hierarchical structure. Similarly, in [SF10], a fine-grained access control and search-
able public-key encryption technique were applied in an EHR system. A hierarchical
access structure was demonstrated to ensure common trust for information sharing.
Calvillo et al. [CRR13] proposed a service-oriented architecture model focused
on security and access control in order to empower patients to manage their own
health information. Choe and Yoo [CY08] presented a “secure multi-agent archi-
tecture” that enables healthcare data access to heterogeneous repositories. A Local
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Access Control (LAC) system enables the transformation and administration of ac-
cess policies by using XML, RBAC and selective encryption. In addition, Chen
et al. [CCW10] developed a fine-grained and adaptable access control for health-
care systems through a structured access control rules in XML. In a further study,
Duftschmid et al. [DRK+13] undertook an EHR-ARCHE project in order to ad-
dress the needs to patient’s shared EHR during a treatment process through EHR
ISO/EN 13606 archetypes into an IHE XDS environment. Although the aforemen-
tioned studies aimed at integrating di↵erent hospital policies, the possible security
exposures and conflicts were not investigated.
4.3 Proposed Architecture
4.3.1 Data Sharing Scenario
We are interested in a scenario where patients’ data are stored in a private cloud or a
public cloud, depending on the access requirements. The data stored in the private
cloud can be shared by physicians, but only if a threshold number of authorised
parties, e.g. physicians, are present. This feature enabled us to handle the patients’
records that are subject to strict privacy control.
This data-sharing application is particularly designed to provide secure interac-
tion among healthcare parties in large geographical areas and scalable systems. We
consider an application of large-scale EHR systems in which the treatment process
involves concurrent or sequential treatments of di↵erent healthcare givers. This ap-
plication could be used for continuity of care of patients who need regular check-ups
and have emergency episodes in chronic conditions. We illustrate a real healthcare
scenario as follows:
When a patient visits a general practitioner in a rural clinic to do a diabetes
checkup, he might need to visit a central hospital for major blood tests or require rare
medicine from a pharmacy. In an acute episode, he visits the Emergency Department
(ED) to receive initial medical. The ED physician then transfers the patient to the
central hospital for major tests and hospitalisation. In the treatment process, the
clinician in the central hospital, laboratory, pharmacy and clinics need to share and
integrate the patient’s health information including treatments, history, test results,
primary care visits and emergency care episodes in the case of sharing experiences
resulting in patient treatment. If the patient’s data contain sensitive and private
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information, two authorised physicians need to be present in order to view or update
the record.
In our solution, we try to facilitate communication and data sharing among the
private domain entities, including hospitals, private clinics, emergency departments
and home healthcare agencies. Meanwhile, we divide the EHR system domain into
two levels, which are respectively handled with two types of cloud: a private cloud
and a public cloud. The private cloud handles the EHR data that are directly used
by medical participants, such as doctors in hospitals and clinics, while the public
cloud handles the EHR data that have been set into a lower level and can be accessed
by external parties (public domain), such as medical researchers and governmental
health authorities.
4.3.2 Our Proposed Architecture
Our EHR system architecture is based on the scenario presented in the previous
subsection with the following requirements:
• Secure EHR data sharing. The protection is required to provide private access
to EHR.
• Privacy enhancement. Additional protection is provided to the private patient
records by prohibiting their access by a single party. In other words, only a
threshold number of authorised parties are allowed to access a private record.
• Policy transformation. Flexibility of handling EHR policies is possible using
our policy transformation approach.
• Fine-grained role-based access control. Fine-grained role-based access control
is provided by using ABE-based technology.
As seen from Figure 4.1, the proposed framework utilises two types of clouds:
a private cloud and a public cloud. The server in the private cloud (Spri) contains
private EHRs, which can only be accessed via the private domain by doctors, spe-
cialists, patients, etc. The server in the public cloud (Spub) contains the information
that might be used by other parties or public domain such as researchers, educators,
insurance companies, government, etc. The access control mechanisms are di↵er-
ent in these clouds due to di↵erent security requirements. In the private cloud, we
utilise the mechanism of RBAC and secret sharing to protect the patients’ privacy.
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In the public cloud, we adopt the scheme of RBAC, but it requires a di↵erent policy.
Therefore, we introduce an approach for policy transformation (TR). As the policy
for the private (Polp) is transferred to that for the public cloud (Polc), the encrypted
data need to be transferred to the public cloud, too, which requires the attribute-
based proxy re-encryption technology [LCLS09]. There is a trusted system server
(S), who sets up the entire system. S (alternatively, Spriv) can also be the proxy
who acts as the party, which converts the encrypted data from the private cloud
to the new encrypted data stored in the public cloud. This transformation can be
conducted with the scheme of proxy re-encryption. One of the challenges to policy
transformation and data conversion lies in the di culty of the task of converting the
policy and shared data to the policy with unshared data, where we assume that se-
cret sharing in the public cloud is not required. In light of the above, our framework
is novel and shows a new way to provide security and privacy to EHRs. Although
several previous works also suggested using RBAC and secret sharing, they adopted
di↵erent ways of handling security and privacy in EHRs.
Figure 4.1: The framework with policy transformation.
4.3.3 Definitions
In this section, we start by defining the basic components for our system and then
define our policy model along with the policy transformation and examples.
Definition 4.1 (Subject) Let S be a set of subjects which are active. Let si 2 S be
a subject variable, which is a user.
A subject is an active user and plays a pivotal role in our system. For example,
it could be a doctor who accesses a patient record according to the access control
policy.
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Definition 4.2 (Role) Let R be a set of roles and rol 2 R be a role variable, which
can be assigned to a user.
A role could be doctor, nurse, dentist, etc. Every user in the system is assigned
a role, which is subject to a permission defined as a tuple (r, w, d, x) meaning read,
write, delete and execute respectively. If permissions are shared, we denote it as
sh⌧n(r, w, d, x), stating that requiring ⌧ of n users to act together to have the per-
missions. When a role is assigned to a user, then the user is granted with the
corresponding permission.
Definition 4.3 (Object) Let O be a set of objects, where oi 2 O for O = {oi},
i = 1, · · · , n, a set of n EHR data.
Objects or EHR data in the access control policy are targets, which are passive.
Their privacy and security are achieved through the access control mechanism. The
key feature of our approach is “policy dynamics”, which captures the variation of
policies. In order to express the policy dynamics, we require a policy to be also a
function of time and domain. By policy dynamic, we mean that policy changes from
one domain to another without compromising security and privacy. Here, domain
refers to the environment where the policy is applied to. We define our syntax by
the role-based model.
Definition 4.4 (Policy) Access control policy Pol defines who gets access to what.
Policy is a tuple Pol ✓ R ⇥ O ⇥ P ⇥ T ⇥ D ⇥ PU , where R,O, P, T,D, PU are
sets of roles, objects, permissions, time space, domains, and purposes respectively.
As an instance of Pol, pol := (rol, o, p, t, d, pu) where o 2 O is a set of EHR data
associated with a patient, p 2 P is the permission, t 2 T is the time (start/end
times), d 2 D is the domain and pu 2 PU is the purpose of access.
Our policy setting is role-based, where each role is pre-assigned to the attributes
defined in pol. If a user is assigned to a role, it will have all the rights specified in
pol.
Definition 4.5 (Policy Transfer) Policy Transfer TR ✓ Pol⇥Pol. As an instance
of TR, tr := (polp, polc), where polp denotes the previous policy and polc denotes the
current policy. As an instance, tr transfers polp to polc, denoted by tr : polp ! polc.
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For example, let tr = (polp : polc) ⇢ TR, for
polp := (physician, ⇤, update, ⇤, private cloud, ⇤)
and
polc := (researcher,MedicalHistory, read, 20150101-20160101, public cloud, research),
where * denotes an arbitrary value of the corresponding attribute. The previous
policy polp is transferred into the current policy polc by the transformation operator
tr. tr plays an important role in the transformation. In the following sub-section,
we will explain how it is realised using cryptographic building blocks.
4.3.4 Access Control and Transformation of EHR Policy
Our approach is based on some existing building blocks, which allow us to con-
cretely conduct policy transformations. The fine-grained RBAC scheme is based on
Ciphertext-Policy Attributed-based Encryption (CP-ABE), which can be used to
define the detailed access structures to EHR data meeting the RBAC policy. Owing
to the requirement of policy transformation, we consider one special type of CP-
ABE, which is called Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption [LCLS09]. The shared
EHR data are based on the threshold encryption [BBH06], which is based on the
secret-sharing scheme proposed by Shamir [Sha79].
To demonstrate our access control, Table 4.1 shows a data access policy in the
private cloud, which is also used as an example of the policy before transformation.
We see that it is transferred into a public policy (Table 4.1), with a policy transfor-
mation. The permissions in the tables are sets of attributes for ABE we adopt. oi
denotes an EHR file; roles are sets as Physician, Physician2 and Nurse. Physician2 is
the role which requires shared access to the EHR o2, where sh25 denotes that at least
2 out of 5 physicians are required to obtain access to o2; the permissions are defined
as read (r), write (w), execute (x) and delete (d). Here, ōi denotes an encrypted
file.
After the policy transformation, the transferred policy given in Table 4.2 has
a new set of attributes (permissions), wrt new roles: Researcher, Auditor and In-
surance Company respectively, which are permitted to read the corresponding EHR
files with a new access key. Here, ô denotes re-encrypted record file o (from ō).
To realise our idea, we utilise several cryptographic building blocks. For the con-
venience of presentation, we define these building blocks in the following definitions:
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Table 4.1: The private cloud access table.
Role Key Permission EHR ID EHR
Physician K1 r w x ¬d id1 ō1
Physician2 K2 sh25 r w x ¬d id2 ō2
Nurse K3 r ¬w ¬x ¬d id3 ō3
Table 4.2: The public cloud access table.
Role Key Permission EHR ID EHR
Researcher K 01 r ¬w ¬x ¬d id1 ô1
Auditor K 02 r ¬w ¬x ¬d id2 ô2
Insurance Company K 03 r ¬w ¬x ¬d id3 ô3
Definition 4.6 A threshold encryption (TE) is a function TE(K,M), which takes
as input the encryption key K and the message M and outputs a ciphertext C1. The
decryption of C1 is a function TD(s1, ..., st), where secret shares s1, ..., st 2 {si}ni=1
and t ( n) is the threshold.
TE is used as threshold secret sharing, i.e. only t of n users can collaboratively
access the encrypted file in order to enhance privacy in the private cloud.
Definition 4.7 (Encryption) Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (ABPRE) is
represented by a function ABPRE(key1,M), with the input of attribute-based en-
cryption key key1 and message M and outputs a ciphertext C2 = ABPRE(key1,M).
We require an ABPRE scheme for encryption of patient records. ABPRE presents
a nice way to implement the role-based access control while the most important fea-
ture of ABPRE is to allow re-encryption by a third party (proxy) without using
the original private key. With this feature, we can build the policy transformation
scheme. Definition 8 defines the re-encryption based on ABPRE.
Definition 4.8 (Re-encryption) ABPRE is a function ABPRE(rekey, C2), where
on input of a rekey and ciphertext C2, it outputs a new ciphertext C3 = ABPRE(key2,
C2), where rekey is associated with key1 and key2.
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The encryption and re-encryption algorithms are described in the following al-
gorithms (Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2).
Data: C2 = 0, C3 = 0;
while Policy = true do
read K, key1, M;









Data: C2 = 0, C3 = 0;




if C 6= 0 then







Recall that policies are associated with encryptions, i.e. to access an encrypted
EHR, a party needs to have a key, which corresponds to a set of authorised attributes
(policy). To convert a current policy to a new one, the trusted authority applies the
proxy re-encrypt algorithm to form a new ciphertext that is encrypted using a new
key corresponding to a new set of attributes, according to the access policy of the
new environment. In our EHR system, the current policy is referred to as the policy
before transformation on the private cloud. However, the new policy is referred to
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the same EHR downgraded to the public cloud, i.e. encrypted with a new key which
corresponds with a new set of attributes.
4.4 An Instance of Application
Let us assume that the following participants are involved.
• The TTP or Server (S). It is an honest-but-curious participant who is re-
sponsible for setting the system up, including key generation, registration,
maintenance, etc. Note that the cloud service provider should not be able to
access plain EHR files in our system, but it is reliable to provide the storage
service.
• Server (Spriv): An honest-but-curious participant that manages private cloud.
• Server (Spub): An honest-but-curious participant that manages public cloud.
• Doctor (D). Doctor is a role, who treats its patients. A doctor could be a
physician who resides in a hospital, clinic, mobile medical service, etc.
• Patient (P ). Patient is a role, who is treated by a doctor, and the patient’s
medical records are stored in the cloud(s).
• Researcher (R). Researcher is a role, who acts as a user and has access to the
designated patient’s records stored in the public cloud.
• Private cloud (PriCloud). Private cloud is a domain, which provides private
storage for the EHR system.
• Public cloud (PubCloud). Public cloud is a domain, which provides storage
for the EHR system and can be used by “public” users such as researchers,
statisticians, etc.
The application protocol is implemented as follows. Suppose that all commu-
nication flows are protected by a normal SSL channel, so they are secured against
eavesdropping.
• System Setup
The S is trusted authorities that bear the full responsibility to set the EHR
system up. The S selects a pair of public/private keys (PK, SK) that are used
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to compute other participants’ keys. There is a set of attributes ai 2 A for
i = 1, ..., n as input for the key generation algorithm. An example of attributes
is (r, w, x, d) as defined earlier in this chapter.
• User Setup
1. U ! S: U , REQU(idi), i 2 ↵.
2. S ! U : SKU .
A system user U in the private domain, such as doctor or patient, sends a
request to the server to be registered for the first time. Here, ↵ is a set of
indices wrt the EHR. REQU(idi) is a request from user (U) to obtain private
decryption keys for records idi 2 ↵. SKU is the private key for U to access
the requested records oi for i 2 ↵ in the private cloud. SKU is generated by
calling the corresponding key generation algorithm with proper attributes and
the role assigned to the user.
• Researcher Setup
1. R! S: R, REQR(idi), i 2  .
2. S ! R: SKR.
Here,   is a set of indices wrt the EHR. REQR is a request from researcher R
in the public domain to obtain private decryption keys for record ôi. SKR is
the private key for R to access record ôi in the public cloud. SKR is generated
by calling the corresponding key generation algorithm and the role assigned
to R.
• Reading Patient Record
We assume that the protocol is executed between doctor D and Spriv in the
private cloud PriCloud.
1. D ! Spriv: REQD(idi).
2. Spriv ! D: ōi.
D, who is a doctor, requests patient record oi wrt idi to Spriv in the private
cloud PriCloud. Spriv found the encrypted record ōi wrt idi. Upon receiving
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ōi, D decrypts it with its private key SKD: oi. The algorithm takes ōi and
SKD as input and returns oi if it can be decrypted, otherwise it returns ?.
polp := (D, ōi, {r, x, w,¬d}, ⇤, P riCloud, ⇤)
• Reading Shared Patient Record
We assume that the protocol is executed between doctor D and Spriv in the
private cloud PriCloud.
1. {Dj}t1 ! Spriv: REQDj(idi).
2. Spriv ! {Di}: shtn(ōi).
3. {Dj}t1: collaboratively compute oi.
Here, a set of doctors send a request to Spriv to access the shared record ōi
wrt idi. Then, Spriv sends shtn(ōi) to these doctors, where at least t members
of {Di}, i = 1, · · · , n can collaboratively compute oi.
• Updating Patient Record
This protocol is executed between a doctor D and Spriv in the private cloud
PriCloud.
1. D ! Spriv: o0i.
2. Spriv: ō0i (store ō
0
i and update the policy accordingly).
Here, doctor D stores the updated record o0i in the private cloud PriCloud.
ō0i is the updated record wrt ōi with attributes ai. This operation is actually
“appending”, where the original content on the record cannot be deleted. Note
that we have assumed that a secure and authenticated SSL channel has been
set up for conventional security. Therefore, the transmission of o0i is secured.
We assume that the encryption is conducted by Spriv.
• Policy Transformation
SPriv: ôi = ABPRE(key2, ōi) ABPRE(key1, ōi),
Spub sends a request to private cloud Spriv for patient record of oi. Spriv (can
also be the proxy) looks up for encrypted record ōi wrt oi for re-encryption.
Spriv takes re-encryption key key2 and the ciphertext ōi as input and outputs
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ôi. Therefore, the previous policy polp has been transferred into the new policy
polc. That is, tr : polp ! polc. As an example, let the policy from the private
cloud be:
polp := (Physician, ō1, {r, w, x,¬d}, ⇤, P riCloud, history)
The new (current) policy after transformation reads:
polc := (Researcher, ô1, {r,¬w, x,¬d}, ⇤, PubCloud, research)
• Reading A Record by Researcher
R holds the key that meets:
polc := (Researcher, ôi, {r,¬w,¬x,¬d}, ⇤, PubCloud, research)
where the key held by R is embedded with the attributes {r,¬w,¬x,¬d}.
1. R! Spub: REQR(idi).
2. Spub ! R: ôi.
Once R received ôi from Spub, he can decrypt it with his key and read the
corresponding patient record.
4.5 Discussions and Remarks
We accomplished our objective of a novel role-based access control approach with the
flexibility of dynamic policy transformation and threshold sharing. We anticipate
that it can be implemented in any hybrid cloud system by healthcare providers.
Our purpose is to simulate our solution because our future work is in a multiple
domain system, including a clinic and hospital, in which multiple physicians and
other medical sta↵ are required to access electronic patient records. We also plan to
implement the threshold sharing as an option, which allows the service provider to
decide the best practice and privacy for the system. The security properties of the
cryptographic building blocks used in our system have been mathematically proven
in the literature [Sha79, LCLS09, BBH06].
Although there are inevitable risks to data sharing, including complex policies
of EHRs data and the increase in the number of users in general, our solution has
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merits of providing scalability, confidentiality and secure data outsourcing. Some of
the foreseen drawbacks to the solution might be potential large overheads for data
dissemination and data retrieval, and di↵erent data formats in di↵erent healthcare
repositories. These issues should be able to be solved with a proper cloud system
and software engineering.
Numerous studies have been undertaken to address the issue of data sharing in
cloud computing with fine-grained access control, such as [DYL+14] and [LHL15],
whereas they considered trusted clouds or single cloud which do not provide dynamic
policy update. Some of the investigated issues in related works include unauthorised
accesses from users of multiple roles, computational complexity, threats to highly
private and confidential EHR data, etc.
We have employed a threshold scheme as an option to increase patient privacy,
but there is no doubt that when the threshold number is 1, it returns to a normal
encryption. In the literature, there are some attempts to introduce threshold secret
sharing to EHR systems. For example, Yi et al. [YMBW13] employed a threshold
encryption scheme to protect the privacy of patient’s data under the multi-party
framework where multiple parties cooperate to control EHR data access without
compromising privacy and security. In addition, Yu and Hou [YH14] proposed a
certificate digital signature scheme based on the Shamir’s threshold scheme and the
Schnorr’s digital signature scheme to enhance the trustworthiness. In [EF13], Er-
makova and Fabian presented an architecture for sharing EHRs in a cloud with the
help of real case study. They designed a multi-provider cloud architecture that fea-
tures Shamir’s secret sharing to distribute EHRs to various cloud services. However,
our threshold approach is built on hybrid cloud and dynamic policy transformation,
which demonstrates a nice application for threshold sharing.
We have not tested our proposed solution yet, as it requires substantial resources
to support a test. As future work, we will conduct a pilot study to test our system.
Consequently, we require a hybrid cloud system (public and private) to host that
has the following components:
• The server programs that implement the role-based access control scheme,
• EHR databases for all the patient records and physicians information,
• Cryptographic units to implement encryption and other schemes, i.e. secret-
sharing required in our system, and
4.6. Conclusion 68
• Data communication units to coordinate data flows amongst all participants.
On the client side (patient, physician, and all other users served by the system)
requires a client-side program, which communicates with the server programs ac-
cording to the established protocols. The client-side program should, at least, host
the following components:
• An access control unit, which implements the access control mechanism in
cooperation with the server programs,
• A cryptographic unit, which implements all cryptographic operations required
to clients, i.e. secret-sharing scheme, RBAC, and
• A communication unit, which handles all communication schemes with the
servers.
The test of e ciency and reliability of the proposed schemes is the main goal.
The testing results will provide a comprehensive overview of the requirement of the
system capacity, including computation capacity and communication capacity.
4.6 Conclusion
We presented an access control mechanism for an EHR system with the hybrid cloud
structure, which allows us to handle various types of users who possess di↵erent
access privileges. Our system features dynamic policy transformation based on some
useful cryptographic building blocks. Our novel policy transformation approach
enables EHR data to be transferred from a private cloud to a public cloud with
the corresponding transformation in the access control policy. We proposed an
implementation protocol for an application scenario.
Chapter 5
Access Control Policy Combination from
Similarity Analysis for Secure
Privacy-preserved EHR Systems
In distributed systems, there is often a need to combine the heterogeneous access
control policies to o↵er more comprehensive services to users in the local or na-
tional level. A large scale healthcare system is usually distributed in a computer
network and might require sophisticated access control policies to protect the sys-
tem. Therefore, the need for integrating the electronic healthcare systems might be
important to provide a comprehensive care for patients while preserving patients’
privacy and data security. However, there are major impediments in healthcare
systems concerning not well-defined and flexible access control policy implementa-
tions, hindering the progress towards secure integrated systems. In this chapter,
we introduce an access control policy combination framework for EHR systems that
preserves patients’ privacy and ensures data security. We achieve our goal through
an access control mechanism which handles multiple access control policies through
a similarity analysis phase. In that phase, we evaluate di↵erent XACML policies
to decide whether or not a policy combination is applicable. We have provided a
case study to show the applicability of our proposed approach based on XACML.
Our study results can be applied to the Electronic Health Record (EHR) access con-
trol policy, which fosters interoperability and scalability among healthcare providers
while preserving patients’ privacy and data security.
5.1 Introduction
An Electronic Health Record (EHR) system is “a repository of information regard-
ing health status of a subject of care”. It combines data from various distributed
healthcare sectors [GBL11]. Since the adoption of EHRs by healthcare providers
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has emerged, there has been a demand to protect patient privacy and security of
medical data through the proper access control policies. Access control policy has
a paramount importance in healthcare systems security to protect medical data.
It may permit the user to get unauthorised access, exposing all unwanted infor-
mation and patient privacy. Thus, well-defined access control policies are essential
for providing confidentiality and limiting the unauthorised access rights to patient’s
data.
The majority of the access control models and policies in EHR systems have
adopted ontological solutions or cryptography techniques for the sake of the con-
straint of patient data access, which cannot provide flexible access rights integration
and pervasive services. A patient data might be subject to the management of sev-
eral data systems, to receive di↵erent types of medical services in the interim, for in-
stance. As a consequence, there are di↵erent versions of EHR and established access
control policies in healthcare systems. On the other hand, access control models may
need to be combined for the integrated and up-to-date systems [WAH12, KKTT14]
for better access policy management and comprehensive access while preserving pa-
tient’s data security and privacy. There exists a gap in the composition of EHR
systems’ access control policies, which could result in inadequate delivery of care
and users’ privacy exposure.
In this work, we contribute an access control policy combination solution that
fosters interoperability and scalability of access control services among di↵erent en-
terprises and preserves patients’ privacy. While there are di↵erent access control
policies for an EHR established in di↵erent entities, we propose a scheme to com-
pute policy similarity of two or more access control policies in EHR before combining
policies. Similarity evaluation process plays a crucial role in preserving users’ privacy
in distributed environments [LRF+13].
We aimed at a more e cient and lightweight approach than previous works to
measure policy similarities. Our proposed approach can be utilised to compare
di↵erent XACML policies and evaluate the combination applicability with low com-
putation complexity. Our access control system framework introduces a new mech-
anism to enforce access policy combination, which is applicable to across di↵erent
healthcare providers with di↵erent types of access control policies.
We illustrate an EHR system scenario and the implementation of the scheme in
XACML. XACML possesses a policy combination scheme, which defines the eligi-
bility of policy combination and rules. Our goal is not redefining how rules should
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be combined, while we want to provide a measure about whether or not two or more
policy sets can be combined, in order to provide a reference to policy administrators.
We provide an instantiation to show the applicability of our solution to the policy
combination in XACML schemes.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the
related work in EHR systems. Section 5.3 introduces our EHR system scenario and
model. Section 5.4 presents our proposed policy combination scheme. Section 5.5
presents the case study. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Related work
Several e↵orts have been devoted to similarity analysis, policy combination and anal-
ysis of access control policies. In a study conducted by Lin et al. [LRBL07], policy
similarity measure is used as a filter for policy similarity analysis and evaluation of
policies. They classified attributes as di↵erent types of categorical attributes and
numeric attributes. In a follow-up work, Lin et al. [LRB+10] proposed a framework
called EXAM which consists a policy analyser component in order to perform dif-
ferent analysis queries expressed in XACML. As Lin et al. [LRF+13] stated, they
proposed a lightweight ranking approach to locating parties with similar policies.
They applied the same method for classifying attributes and computing the similar-
ity score with the proposed case study.
In a recent work, Bertolino et al. [BDK+15] performed access control test pri-
oritisation relying on similarity criteria. They used similarity matrix to compute
dissimilarity among di↵erent policies and then calculate policy similarities.
With respect to the policy combination, Li et al. [LWR+08] proposed a Pol-
icy Combining Language (PCL) to express Policy Combining Algorithms (PCA) in
XACML. They applied evaluation of PCAs using finite state automata. In a sem-
inal study in this area [RLB+11], Rao et al. proposed an algebra for fine-grained
integration of policies with a framework to use the algebra in XACML policies. In
this study, a set of operators used to edit a policy with pre-defined properties. In
a study which set out to determine policy integration [MBC06], Mazzoleni et al.
proposed an XACML policy integration algorithm to enable collaboration of au-
tonomous subjects sharing their sources. They computed rule similarity based on
policy rule similarity types. Then, the policy integration performs based on rule
e↵ects. In addition, Don et al. [DMS+11] proposed a privacy policy aggregation in
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P3P. They attempted to capture privacy issues in service aggregation with the same
concepts.
A large and growing body of literature has investigated access control models
and policies in healthcare systems with cryptographic and non-cryptographic tech-
niques. There are many access control mechanisms proposed in EHR systems, such
as broker-based access control. There are di↵erent types of access control mod-
els, including Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC) and Cryptographic Access Control (CAC). RBAC is the most common
access control model in healthcare systems [ASLT13], however, ABAC has been a
desired option due to its flexibility in the policy descriptions. Notably, among all
di↵erent access control strategies, XACML is an open standard of access control
policy languages, which has been desirable to define flexible access control policies
in healthcare systems [RWS15].
In [MA12], a system architecture and protocols to enable patient control over
its health information have been proposed. In this study, Public Key Encryption
(PKE) used to secure patient data. In the same vein, Chen et al. [CLC+12] proposed
an access control scheme using Symmetric Key Encryption (SKE) which supports
multi-user access dynamically in cloud computing. Moreover, Zhang et al. [ZLX14]
proposed a role-based and time-based access control with spatial and temporal di-
mensions to improve fine-granularity of time-bound access control.
5.3 EHR system scenario
We consider a case (Fig. 5.1) in which there are di↵erent pre-established access
control policies in an EHR system associated with di↵erent types of treatments. As
an instance of policies, there are di↵erent types of insurance policies in order to
cover patient treatment including general treatment policy and hospital policy. The
hospital policy covers the patient treatments when he goes to a hospital, whereas
general treatment policy covers him when goes to a medical centre for an ancillary
treatment purpose, such as optical treatment. These two policies are set by two
di↵erent users on the same patients’ data, which can be in the same healthcare
provider or di↵erent. If a patient visits an optical specialist in a hospital to perform
an eye laser surgery, a comprehensive cover for the patient treatment will be desired.
Hence, general treatment policy and hospital policy are needed to be combined as
“Mix and Match” to o↵er a packaged policies that can cover both hospital and
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general treatment services and preserves patient’s privacy. The advantages of this
solution is a high quality and time-saving continuity of care, which undoubtedly
ensures patient’s data security and privacy.
Figure 5.1: EHR Policy combination Scenario
As shown in Fig. 5.1, the Access Control Server (ACS) plays the XACML Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) role as the service interface in [OAS09]. There are au-
thorities as Policy Information Point (PIP) that store users’ access rights. The PIP
sub-components are repository, policy authoring function, policy testing and analy-
sis function, policy distribution function and Policy Decision Point (PDP)[OAS15].
Access control databases or Policy Administration authority Point (PAP) interacts
with PIP in making policies available to access control Policy Combination Service
(PCS). The PCS acts as PDP, which interacts with PAP and PIP to compute pol-
icy combination based on access control policy combination framework and interacts
with ACS for enforcing the combination function (PEP).
5.4 Proposed policy combination system
Our policy combination framework is depicted in Fig. 5.2. It shows that XACML
policies in the form of PAP are used by Policy Combining Service (PCS) to check
the similarities and compute the Combination Applicability Value (CAP). Policy
Similarity Analyser (PSA) computes the similarity score among sets of policies.
Our system model enables the policy owner to specify the e↵ects and attributes
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in order to compare the policies. We illustrate the essential components which are
needed to be analysed in PSA, including policy, policy-sets, rule and rule-sets in
XACML.
It is essential to apply combining algorithms in both policies in order to mea-
sure combination applicability. This plays a pivotal role in protecting data against
unauthorised accesses and preserving users’ privacy. In our system, a Policy Com-
bination Algorithm (PCA) allows policy combination according to the combination
applicability value. It is worth noting that the attribute overriding specification can
be placed in the XACML data-flow diagram to prioritise each attribute including
subjects, resource, action and environment, leading to a fine-grained policy similar-
ity analysis. The similarity analysis phase measures the similarity of attributes and
e↵ects in the given policies based on similarity formulas.
Policies can be combined based on comparing the RCA and PCA in the proposed
Policy Combination Service (PCS) (Fig. 5.2). The Rules Combination process
consists of the Similarity Analysis that checks the attributes, conditions and e↵ects
of the set of rules in the given policies, in order to measure the similarity value.
Figure 5.2: Policy Combination Framework in XACML.
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5.4.1 Definitions
Before introducing the policy combination algorithm, we present the definition of
PolicySet, Policy and Rule.
Definition 5.1 (PolicySet) Let PolicySet be a set of Pols ⇢ T ⇥ PCA⇥ Pol where
T, PCA, and Pol denote Target of PolicySet, Policy-Combining Algorithm and set
of Policies, respectively. As an instance of Pols
Pols := {{t1, . . . , tn}, {D,P,NA,Ud}, {pol1, . . . , polm}},
where {t1, . . . , tn} denotes a set of attributes of target, D deny, P permit, NA non-
applicable, Ud undecidable, and {pol1, . . . , polm} a set of policies.
Definition 5.2 (Policy) Let Policy be a tuple Pol ✓ T⇥RCA⇥R where T, PCA,R
are Target, Rule-Combining Algorithm, and Rule, respectively. As an instance of
Pol,
Pol := {{t1, . . . , tn}, {D,P,NA,Ud}, {r1, . . . , rm}},
where {t1, . . . , tn} denotes a set of attributes of target, D deny, P permit, NA non-
applicable, Ud undecidable, and {r1, . . . , rm} a set of rules.
Definition 5.3 (Rule) Let Rule be a set of R = {T,C,E} where (T,C,E) are Tar-
get, Condition and E↵ect. An instance of R is denoted by r := (t, c, e), where t 2 T is
a target of rule, c 2 C, where C = {Att, Op, V } denote the attribute of condition, op-
eration and value, e 2 E, where E = {D,P} denote Permit and Deny wrt an e↵ect.
T = {subj, res, act, env} denote Subject, Resource, Action 2 {rd, w, del, app, exe},
and Environment attributes, where rd denotes “read”, w “write”, del “delete”, app
“append” and exe “execute”.
The policy-set specifies the target that policy is applicable to and a set of policies,
e.g. policy of hospital A. Each policy-set contains a policy combining algorithm that
prioritises the policies’ combination function. Consequently, each policy in a policy-
set contains the combining algorithms for combining rules and a set of rules that
define access rights. Users in the system can define their access privileges through
a set of rules comprising the attributes of targets, the conditions of access to data
and permit or deny access. For example, Rule R = {(FinanceSta↵, Billinginfo, Read,
HospitalA), 8 < Time < 17, Permit} denotes that the finance sta↵ in HospitalA have
the permission to read patient’s billing information during business hours.
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5.4.2 Policy similarity
In [BDK+15] and [LRF+13], the similarity wrt attributes is computed in a hierar-
chical structure. To better serve our goal, we employ a linear equation to compute
the similarity value, resulting in lower computation complexity. A case study is
illustrated in next section to clarify EHR policy combination.
Definition 5.4 (Equal Policies) The similarity score reflects the similarity of the
policies wrt rules. Policies that comprise similar targets and conditions and can be
applied to same requests are called Equal Policies. Equal policies consist of similar
targets and rules.
We compute the similarity score among two policies pol 2 Pol and pol0 2 Pol0
with the following formula in which the target of policies are declared by rules:
S(pol, pol0) = !pSPrule set + !dSDrule set, (5.1)
SPrule set and S
D
rule set are the similarity scores of policies based on same e↵ects
(Deny, Permit), respectively. !p is the importance weight for permit rules, !d is the
importance weight for deny rules and !t is the importance weight of policy targets
similarity, where !p + !d = 1. However, if there are any separated policy targets,
the similarity would be computed as
S(pol, pol0) = !tSTrule set + !pSPrule set + !dSDrule set, (5.2)
We illustrate the similarity computation in the following section.
Similarity measure
In order to compute rules similarity, we map and compare rule ri 2 R of policy pol
to a set of rules r0j 2 R0 belonging to pol0 of the same e↵ect E. As Permit and Deny
rule sets are defined similarly, in the following, we only present a general case of
computation, for either Permit or Deny rule set. This process is demonstrated as
mapping one-to-many over the sum of all the mappings in the rule as given in Eq.
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Srule(ri, r0j) computes the similarity of rules ri and r0j based on rule targets and rule
conditions in Eq. (5.4) :
Srule(ri, r0j) = !tSt(ri, r0j) + !cSc(ri, r0j), (5.4)
where
St(ri, r0j) = a1ssubj(ri, r
0
j) + a2sres(ri, r
0
j)





j) = b1sAtt(ri, r
0
j) + b2sOp(ri, r
0
j) + b3sV (ri, r
0
j). (5.6)
Here, St(ri, r0j) denotes the similarity score of rule targets and Sc(ri, r
0
j) denotes





and senv(ri, r0j) are similarity scores of subject, resource, action and environment
attributes, respectively. We require a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 = 1. satt(ri, r0j), sop(ri, r
0
j),
sv(ri, r0j) are the similarity scores of Attr, Op and V , respectively. We require
b1 + b2 + b3 = 1. In addition, the importance weights must satisfy !t + !c = 1. The
value of base similarity is ranged in [0,1]. In the following sections, we present the
similarity computation of attributes and conditions.
We evaluate the attribute similarity among rules of di↵erent policies pol and pol0
that results in the similarity score of the attributes St of both policies. We use St(R)
in Eq. (5.3) for computing rules similarity with the same e↵ect, to clarify, St(ri, r0j)
results the mapping ri with r0j.
Take an example. Assuming a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 1/4 and ssubj(ri, r0j) = 2/5,
sres(ri, r0j) = 0, sact(ri, r
0
j) = 2/3, and senv(ri, r
0
j) = 0, the similarity score of rule
















· 0 = 0.27
Definition 5.5 (Named Attribute) Let Att = {a1⌦v1, . . . , ai⌦vi} be a set of named
attributes where ai is a binary attribute, vi is a value, and ⌦ : {, , <,>,=, 6=} is
an operation over the set of attributes.
In XACML, named attributeAtt is a specific instance of an attribute, determined
by the attribute name and type, the identity of the attribute holder (which may be of
type: subject, resource, action or environment) and (optionally) the identity of the
issuing authority. In order to compute the similarity score of the rules’ conditions,
we use three types of attributes as ConditionAtt, Operation and V alue (Eq. (5.6)).
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Provided that the conditions of rules ri and r0j are similar, the similarity score
will be Sc = 1, otherwise 0  Sc  1. In particular, where either of rules involves a
condition, restricting another rule, the Sc = 1/2.
For instance, we take two conditions for granted as r1 : T  9.00PM and
r02 : 6.00PM  T  9.00PM where the similarity can be computed with the
















where we assume equal weights of the elements and sAtt(ri, r0j) = 1, sOp(ri, r
0
j) = 1/2,
and sV (ri, r0j) = 1/2.
In order to compute the similarity of rules, a comparison of rules’ components
belonging to the same e↵ects is essential. Given two policies pol and pol0, our
algorithm groups policy’ rules based on two di↵erent e↵ects permit and deny shown
as E : {P,D}. We use numerical predicates to evaluate the similarity of rules based
on same values. Each rule in pol is compared to a single rule (one-one mapping) in




















which is assumed to be SPrule set, and SDrule set can be computed in the same way. Say
its value is the same. Targets of policies are the same as well. The final similarity
result can then be computed with Eq. (5.2), where STpol,pol0 is the similarity score of
the targets of policies (algorithm 3):




⇥ 1 + 1
3




Algorithm 3 shows the process of rule similarity computation according to Eq.
(5.3). Rules in policies P1 and P2 are compared according to same e↵ects, deny
or permit. Then, the total similarity is the addition of similarity of both policies
according to policy targets and e↵ects.
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1 Let rD1i and r
P
1i denote the set of deny and permit rules in P1
2 Let rD2j and r
P
2j denote the set of deny and permit rules in P2
3 foreach r1i 2 PP1 and r2j 2 PP2 do SPrule(ri, rj);
4 foreach r1i 2 PD1 and r2j 2 PD2 do SDrule(ri, rj);
5 foreach ri 2 P1 do S(ri, rj);
6 foreach rj 2 P2 do S(ri, rj);
7 if ri 2 PP1 , rj 2 PP2 then
8 foreach ri 2 P1, rj 2 P2 do SP (ri, rj);
9 return SP (ri, rj)
10 else if ri 2 PD1 ,rj 2 PD2 then
11 foreach ri 2 P1, rj 2 P2 do SD(ri, rj);
12 return SD(ri, rj)
13 else return null ;
14 for SP and SD do
Sc(r1, r2);
end
15 return SP1,P2 = !tST (P1, P2) + !pSP (P1, P2) + !dSD(P1, P2);
Algorithm 3: RuleSimilarityMeasure Algorithm (P1, P2)
5.4.3 Policy combination
The similarity evaluation approach presented in the previous section allows the
decision maker to decide if two or more policies should be combined. In the case of
yes, these target policies should be combined based on the rule-combining algorithm
and policy-combining algorithm provided in the XACML specification.
CAP(pol, pol0) = Srca(pol, pol0)⇥ S(pol, pol0) (5.7)




Finally, the similarity value can be used in Eq. (5.7) to output the combination
applicability value CAP(pol, pol0) :
CAP(pol, pol0) = Srca(pol, pol0)⇥ S(pol, pol0)
= 1⇥ 0.64
= 0.64
As it is shown in algorithm 4, the multiplication of Srca and similarity of both
policies outputs CAP :
Here, we adopt the similarity Srca(pol, pol0) wrt the rule combination algorithm
defined in XACML. We assume that pol and pol0 have adopted the XACML rule
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1 for CAP(P1, P2) do
(Srca)S(P1, P2) ;
2 return CAP(P1, P2) ;
end
Algorithm 4: Combination Applicability Value
combination algorithm, respectively. Our similarity evaluation takes them into ac-
count. In other words, we assume that the similarity evaluation also considers how
the XACML combination algorithms are used in target policies. We will describe
how to evaluate Srca in the next section.
Combining Algorithms
Recall that XACML contains a set of Policy, PolicySet and Rule elements with the
rule-combining algorithm and policy-combining algorithm for combining the results
of their evaluation process used by PDP unit. Combining algorithms can be declared
by a RuleCombiningAlgId or PolicyCombiningAlgId attribute of Policy or PolicySet
elements. To be precise, the PolicySet element contains a set of Policy elements and a
policy-combining algorithm for combining a set of policies. Likewise, Policy element
contains a set of Rule elements and a rule-combining algorithm for combining a set of
rules. The XACML combining algorithm rules include, Deny-overrides (Ordered and
Unordered), Permit-overrides (Ordered and Unordered), First-applicable and Only-one-
applicable. The Srca can be specified in Tables 5.1 to 5.4 according to rca (Algorithm
5).
Deny-overrides: Let P,D,NA, and Ud denote Permit, Deny, Non-applicable,
and Undecidable, respectively. Deny-overrides (Table 5.1) says D > P > NA > Ud,
which means that the evaluation result of a single Rule or Policy is Deny, regardless
of the other Rule or Policy. Then, the Srca is 1 when there is one D, overriding
the other rule’s e↵ect. Similarly, Permit-overrides (Table 5.2)(P > D > NA > Ud)
indicates that the evaluation result of a single Rule or Policy will be Permit if a
single Permit is appeared. Then Srca is 1 when there is one P , overriding the other
rule’s e↵ect.
First-applicable (Table 5.3) combining algorithm outputs the result of evaluating
the first Rule or Policy element, which has applicable target and condition to the
decision request. We consider Srca = 1 when polrca = pol
0
rca, and Srca = 1/2 when
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1 if rca1 and rca2 = Deny-overrides then
2 return Srca (Table 5.1);
3 else if rca1 and rca2 = Permit-overrides then
4 return Srca (Table 5.2);
5 else if rca1 and rca2 = First-applicable then
6 return Srca (Table 5.3);
7 else if pca1 and pca2 = Only-one applicable then
8 return Spca (Table 5.4);






Algorithm 5: Combination Similarity
Table 5.1: Deny Override (ordered and unordered)
pol pol0 P D NA Ud
P P (1) D (1) P (1/2) Un (0)
D D (1) D (1) D (1) D (1)
NA P (1/2) D (1) NA (0) Ud (0)
Ud Ud (0) D (1) Ud (0) Ud (0)
both e↵ects are applicable. Only-one-applicable (Table 5.4) only applies to policies,
which means that only one policy or policy-set is applicable. If none of the policies
is applicable, the result will be NotAplicable, Spca = 0. On the other hand, the
result will be Undecidable if more than one policy is applicable. When one policy
applies, Spca = 1/2, otherwise, Spca = 0 (Tables 5.1-5.4).
To clarify, “permit-overrides rule-combining algorithm” means that if any rule
evaluates to “True”, the access is permitted, otherwise, it returns “NotApplicable”.
In the case of an error, the rule evaluation will return “Undecidable”. The rule-
combining algorithm therefore specifies the combination of rules values into a single
policy value.
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Table 5.2: Permit Override (ordered and unordered)
pol pol0 P D NA Ud
P P (1) P (1) P (1) P (1)
D P (1) D (1) D (1/2) D (1/2)
NA P (1) D (1/2) NA (0) Ud (0)
Ud P (1) D (1) Ud (0) Ud (0)
Table 5.3: First-applicable
pol pol0 P D NA Ud
P P(1) P (1/2) P (1/2) P (1/2)
D D (1/2) D (1) D (1/2) D (1/2)
NA P (1/2) D (1/2) NA (0) Ud (0)
Ud Ud (0) Ud (0) Ud (0) Ud(0)
5.5 A Case study
In this section, we provide a case study of policy combination in an EHR system.
Take as an example where in hospital A, which o↵ers a variety of healthcare ser-
vices, both patient and policy owner (or system administrator) defined two types
of privacy policies. In this case, they defined their own preferred privacy policies.
As a consequence, in a case of conflicts of two established access control policies,
patient data will not be accessible to caregivers. The patient denies any “write”
and “delete” access permissions to its patient history by sta↵ and doctors (GPs),
whereas policy custodian permits only “read” and “write” access rights. The pa-
tient’s billing information cannot be deleted or changed by either patient or sta↵,
then any changes are denied. Under no circumstances can billing information be
accessible out of business hours. In addition, a patient permits “read”, “write” and
“delete” access rights to laboratory, GP and Pharmacist.
In the best case scenario, policy combination process starts with assessing rule-
combining algorithms, which is deny-overrides here. Policies can then go through the
rule-similarity analysis phase to compute the similarity score among rules, show the
probability of combining two policies. In Table 5.5 and 5.6, we provide the example
of pol and pol0 written in XACML. Based on them, we calculate the similarity
scores. The similarity of both policies is analysed and then combined according to
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Table 5.4: Only-One Applicable
pol pol0 P D NA Ud
P NA (0) NA (0) P (1/2) Ud(0)
D NA (0) NA (0) D (1/2) Ud(0)
NA P (1/2) D (1/2) NA (0) Ud(0)
Ud Ud (0) Ud (0) Ud (0) Ud (0)
the proposed combination framework. As the result of CAP shows, policies pol1 and
pol2 have the similarity score over 0.5 and could be combined. Note that the score
of similarity is only a reference for the decision maker to decide whether they should
be combined or not.
1. We categorise rules in policies pol1, pol2 based on their e↵ects and find rules
with the same e↵ects. Here, superscribes P and D denote Permit and Deny,
respectively.
polP1 : {r11} , polD1 : {r12}
polP2 : {r21} , polD2 : {r22} , polD2 : {r23}
2. We compute the rule similarity scores between pairs of rules belong to the
same e↵ects based on a set of attributes. Then, we compute the similarity of
conditions and targets between rules with same e↵ects.
Sc(r11, r21) = 0











Sc(r12, r23) = 0










4 ⇥ 1)] = 0.52




4 ⇥ 1) + (
1
4 ⇥ 1) + (
1
4 ⇥ 1)] = 0.87




4 ⇥ 0) + (
1
4 ⇥ 1) + (
1
4 ⇥ 1)] = 0.62
3. We compute rule similarity score based on similar targets and conditions.
S(r11, r21) = 12 [St(r11, r21) + Sc(r11, r21)] = [
1
2 ⇥ 0.52 +
1
2 ⇥ 0] = 0.26
S(r12, r22) = 12 [St(r12, r22) + Sc(r12, r22)] = [
1
2 ⇥ 0.87 +
1
2 ⇥ 0.5] = 0.68
S(r12, r23) = 12 [St(r12, r23) + Sc(r12, r23)] = [
1
2 ⇥ 0.62 +
1
2 ⇥ 0.5] = 0.56
4. For each rule ri in policy pol1, we compute the similarity to a set of rules in
pol2.
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Table 5.5: The instances of pol and pol0 written with XACML.










<Subject Designation belong to {GP, Nurse, Pharmacist, Staff} > <Subject Designation belong to {Laboratory, GP,Pharmacist} >
<Resource FileType belong to {PatientHistory} > <Resource FileType belong to {Prescription} >







<Subject Designation belong to {Staff} > <Subject Designation belong to {Staff, Patient} >
<Resource FileType belong to {BillingInfo} > <Resource FileType belong to {BillingInfo} >
<Action AccessType belong to {Write, Delete} > <Action AccessType belong to {Write, Delete} >






<Subject Designation belong to {Staff, GP} >
<Resource FileType belong to {PatientHistory} >
<Action AccessType belong to {Write, Delete} >




Spol1,pol2r11 = Spol1,pol2r21 : S(r11, r21) = 0.26
Spol1,pol2r22 : S(r22, r12) = 0.68
Spol1,pol2r23 : S(r23, r12) = 0.56
Spol1,pol2r12 : 12 [S(r12, r22) + S(r12, r23)] = [
1
2 ⇥ 0.68 +
1
2 ⇥ 0.56] = 0.62
5. The average of permit rules similarity and deny rule similarities with similarity
of conditions are computed as following:




21 ] = [
1
2 ⇥ 0.26 +
1
2 ⇥ 0.26] = 0.26







= [13 ⇥ 0.62 +
1
3 ⇥ 0.68 +
1
3 ⇥ 0.56] = 0.62
6. The similarity among each pair of policies is computed as following:
S(pol1, pol2) = 13 [S
T (pol1, pol2) + S
D(pol1, pol2) + S
P (pol1, pol2)]
= [13 ⇥ 1 +
1
3 ⇥ 0.62 +
1
3 ⇥ 0.26] = 0.63
7. We compute the combination value to find the applicability of policies combi-
nation.
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<Subject Designation belong to {Pharmacist, Nurse, Staff} >
<Resource FileType belong to {PatientHistory} >







<Subject Designation belong to {Laboratory, GP, Pharmacist} >
<Resource FileType belong to {Prescription} >







<Subject Designation belong to {Staff, patient} >
<Resource FileType belong to {BilingInfo} >
<Action AccessType belong to {Write, Delete} >







<Subject Designation belong to {Staff, GP} >
<Resource FileType belong to {PatientHistory} >
<Action AccessType belong to {Delete, Write} >




CAP(pol1, pol2) = Srca(pol1, pol2)⇥ S(pol1, pol2) = 1⇥ 0.63 = 0.63
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced the policy similarity to deal with multiple access
control policies, which adds a layer of functionality to implementing the XACML
system. A similarity value specifies the applicability of policies combination. Our
approach provides a solution for the decision maker to decide whether two or more
XACML policies should be combined, based on the value of policy similarity. Our
proposed tool can be placed on the top of these algorithms. Our access control
policy combination solution has been shown useful in our case study in order to
preserve the privacy of users and ensure data security.
Chapter 6
Practical and Secure Telemedicine
Systems for User Mobility
The application of wireless devices has led to a significant improvement in the qual-
ity delivery of care in telemedicine systems. Patients who live in a remote area are
able to communicate with the healthcare provider and benefit from the doctor con-
sultations. However, it has been a challenge to provide a secure telemedicine system,
which captures users (patients and doctors) mobility and patient privacy. Our work
addresses these issues. Owing to the importance of patient’s information and com-
munication channels prone to di↵erent attacks, protecting patient records becomes
an inevitable necessity. In this chapter, we present secure protocols for telemedicine
systems, which ensure the secure communication between patients and doctors who
are located in di↵erent geographical locations. Our protocols are the first of this
kind featured with confidentiality of patient information, mutual authentication,
patient anonymity, data integrity, freshness of communication and mobility. Our
security protocols are symmetric-key based in order to better serve our objectives of
research for secure telemedicine services. We present four di↵erent scenarios which
cover almost all common situations for practical applications.
6.1 Introduction
In traditional medical systems, patients have to visit a clinic or a hospital to have a
doctor consultation and treatment; therefore, it is inconvenient for elderly patients
and patients residing in rural and distant areas, especially for those with chronic
diseases. Thanks to Telecare Medical Information Systems (TMIS) which have made
outstanding advances and provided e cient communications among patients and
doctors. Although many countries are demanding home-based long-term care in
order to provide e cient treatment for patients and increase their quality of lives, it
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also arises some security and privacy concerns among healthcare providers and users
in terms of disclosing patient information in insecure communication channels.
The growth of wireless network devices in medical services has been in an in-
evitable pace to o↵er various applications in healthcare. There are many studies
addressing the security pitfalls of TMIS through various methods; however, there
are still many security issues and implementation obstacles. Medical information
should be protected through authenticated channels and cryptographic solutions.
There are many works in the literature, which have proposed various solutions.
However, it is still a challenge to provide an e cient and secure system which cap-
tures all necessary needs for remote medical services, including mobility of patients
and doctors as well as the anonymity of patients against disclosure of patient iden-
tities.
In this work, for the first time, we capture all the aforementioned features for
practical and ideal telemedicine service. As the main contribution, we systemati-
cally studied how to secure the wireless medical systems while patients and doctors
can be mobile and in the meanwhile, patients can still remain anonymous. We over-
come the security hurdle due to the mobility of patients and doctors. We present
our approaches with four application scenarios in terms of the mobility and show
that in those scenarios, patients and doctors can establish a secure communication
channel which meets all our security and privacy requirements, i.e., patient’s privacy
(anonymity), communication freshness, data confidentiality and data integrity.
Before presenting our protocols, we review related work and show the research
gap that our work will fill.
In the literature, many security schemes have been proposed to ensure secure
communication. These studies employed user authentication and session key agree-
ment protocols [AIB+15, KKLW16]. However, the proposed solutions su↵er from
di↵erent types of attacks, insider attacks, anonymity problems, replay attacks, etc
[WLL+12b, HCZ12, WHL12, JMML13, JMLT14, MSM14].
We noticed that there are some works which have considered confidentiality and
authentication in telemedicine (or can be potentially applied to telemedicine). For
instance, Yang et al. [YKM15] proposed a privacy-preserving authentication scheme
with adaptive key evolution. A similar work proposed by Chen et al. [CLC16]
discussed multi-channel safety authentication protocols in wireless networks. Jiang
et al. [JLY+16] also proposed an authentication scheme for wireless body area
networks in mhealth. However, they do not address the mobility of patients and
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doctors
There are further proposed solutions for telemedicine systems o↵ering authenti-
cation schemes [HCZ12, WHL12, JMML13, JMLT14], which provide authentications
services for patients, healthcare server, doctors, along with the security analysis on
impersonation attack, replay attack, message authenticity, backward/forward se-
crecy and confidentiality. In addition, some other studies provide biometric-based
authentication schemes [MSM14]. In the literature, gateways are designated to reg-
ister patients and doctors, which can threat the security if an attacker eavesdrops
the intermediate point. Rahman et al. [RMH+16] also considered patient privacy
using an attribute-based setting.
We compare the security properties of our protocols with other proposed solu-
tions in Table 6.1. As it is clearly stated, aforementioned studies in the literature
o↵er some security properties which have been mentioned; however, they have only
captured some basic security properties without considering mobility. Our work is
the only work which captures this important feature for telemedicine.
Security properties [AIB+15] [WLL+12b] [HCZ12] [WHL12] [JMML13] [YKM15] [JLY+16] Our protocol
Confidentiality Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Anonymity No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Mobility No No No No No No No Yes
Table 6.1: Comparison of the proposed scheme with related works.
In the following sections, we first present our system model and our security as-
sumptions (Section 6.2). Based on them we demonstrate four practical telemedicine
scenarios and their secure communication protocols and routing tables in Section
6.3 and 6.4, along with two clinical examples in Section 6.5. We also provide the
security analysis in Section 6.6. We conclude the chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 System Model and Security Requirements
6.2.1 System Model
We consider a general case in a medical system, which consists of a healthcare
centre, patients and doctors. Consider a scenario of telemedicine, it consists of a
healthcare provider, authentication server, patients and doctors. For simplicity and
clearness of presentation, we refer to “authentication server” as an entity which
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represents healthcare provider, system administration and security service. Patients
and doctors are registered in the authentication server.
Figure 6.1: System model.
We provide a solution to telemedicine which can be wireless and wired. Our
solution captures security and privacy requirements mentioned earlier along with
mobility of users. In Fig. 6.1, we illustrate our system model, where the healthcare
centre provides the entire service, users (doctors and patients) are located at di↵erent
regions or domains, which are serviced by authentication servers (local or remote),
depending on the user location. In our model, we allow users to move to a di↵erent
domain dynamically while maintaining their ability to communicate securely with
each other. Our system captures all possible situations and provides the same level
of security services to users, regardless of the type of location.
6.2.2 Security Requirements and Notations
We presume that users (patients and doctors) belong to their home-area network,
in which they are registered. Users share a long-term secret key with their home
server. The setup of the key is done at the registration. Our system only requires
symmetric keys, which o↵er much better computational e ciency. We consider the
following security assumptions for our protocols:
• Confidentiality. We assume that all users share a long-term key with their
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home server (or authentication server). With this as the basis, we can con-
struct secure channels against eavesdropping from outsiders. Here, by out-
siders, we mean that anyone who is not registered with the system and those
who have registered with the system but are not involved in the protocol exe-
cution.
• Anonymity. We require all patients’ identities to be protected against out-
siders.
• Authentication. We require mutual authentication between patient and servers
as well as patient and doctor. We achieve mutual authentication by allowing
trust between users and their home server as well as trust amongst all servers.
• Freshness. Freshness against replay attacks from outsiders. We achieve this
feature by using nonces. Notice that we can add timestamps to our protocols
to secure them against suppress attacks; however, for simplicity we omit it.
We only use the timestamp for service tickets.
• Integrity. Integrity against all outsiders is achieved with message authentica-
tion code (MAC).
In Table 6.2, we provide the notations used in the description of the protocols.
Ui: the i-th user’s ID (a user could be a patient Pi or a doctor Di)
Usi,j : the i-th user’s j-th subliminal ID
HS : Home-server
RS : Remote-server
Ku,v: Shared secret-symmetric key between party u and v
ks: Secret session key
T : Time stamp
[Data]k: Data encrypted with a symmetric key k
h(·): A secure cryptographic hash function
nu: Nonce generated by user U
Ui ! Uj : message: Ui sends message to Uj
Table 6.2: Notations
6.2.3 System Setup
There are two types of servers in our system model, including home server and
remote server.
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• Home Server (HS): HS is situated in the home-area network that stores the
real identity of user U, who can be a doctor (D) or a patient (P), and a long-
term secret-symmetric key Ku,hs, which is shared by a user and HS. HS also
maintains a routing table (Tabhs) which stores the real identity of the user and
the corresponding subliminal identity and provides the mapping of them. It
also stores a long-term secret key Khs,rs that is used to communicate between
the home server HS and the remote server RS.
• Remote Server (RS): RS is situated in the remote-area network and stores
a long-term secret key Khs,rs that is used to communicate between HS and
RS and a long-term secret key Kru,rs, which is shared by the remote user and
RS. To remote users, RS is their HS, if they have registered at the RS as their
home server. Similarly to the HS, the RS maintains a routing table (Tabrs) to
service its registered users.
All patients and doctor need to register with their home server in order to receive
the service.
• Patient Registration : The registration phase is a one-time process between
a patient and its home server HS. The purpose of patient registration is to
setup the shared long-term secret key and register its identity. In turn, the
patient will receive a subliminal identity and the secret key Kp,hs. As an
option, Kp,hs can be derived from the patient’s password. In this case, the
patient should setup its password during the registration phase. The HS will
update its table which stores the mappings of real identity and subliminal
identity.
• Doctor Registration : Only di↵erence between patient registration and doc-
tor registration is that the doctor is not anonymous, i.e., there is no need to
assign a subliminal identity to a doctor. Therefore, the doctor identity is reg-
istered with its HS and obtains a long-term secret key shared with the HS. As
an option, Kd,hs can be derived from the doctor’s password. In this case, the
doctor should setup its password during the registration phase.
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6.3 Protocols
We consider four practical scenarios, for a patient to establish a secure communi-
cation channel with its doctor who is located at the same or a di↵erent location.
They communicate by an established wireless or wired communication system. The
protocols for other scenarios can be easily obtained with the protocols for these four
typical scenarios.
6.3.1 Scenario 1
We consider a scenario (Fig. 6.2) where a patient who is situated in its own local
place needs to consult with a doctor due to its illness. In this scenario, both the
patient and the doctor reside in the same communication domain, which is the home
for both of them and is managed by HS.
Figure 6.2: Scenario 1. The figure on the left-hand side is for the patient ticket
granting. The figure on the right-hand side is for the consultation session.
1. Obtaining a ticket.
The objective of this phase is to establish a secure communication channel
between a patient and a doctor. This process requires mutual authentication
between the patient and the doctor. This is done with the help of the HS
who is trusted by the patient and the doctor. The output from this phase is
a session key shared by the patient and the doctor. The following protocol is
conducted by patient P and home-sever HS in order to obtain a service from
doctor D. The patient P has a subliminal identity: Psj . For simplicity, we have
omitted the subscript i.
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(a) P! HS : Ps1,HS,D, np,MACK
p,hs
(Ps1,HS,D, np)













With the Ticketp,d, the patient P can contact the doctor for consultation.
2. Remote consultation phase.
In this phase, the patient P communicates with the doctor D by sending
Ticketp,d to D. In turn, the doctor D replies to the patient P to confirm
the establishment of the communication channel. The communication before
P and D is conducted via the home server HS. Therefore, the subliminal iden-
tity of P can still be used to protect the patient. For simplicity, we omit the
intermedia steps.
(a) P! (HS)! D : Ps1,D, np,Ticket,MACks(Ps1,D, np,Ticket)
(b) D! (HS)! P : D,Ps1, np, ok,MACks(D,Ps1, np, ok)
(c) P! (HS)! D : · · · Consultation request
(d) D! (HS)! P : · · · Reply
This communication channel can last while there is a necessity. All the com-
munication messages are encrypted with session key ks, which provides the
secure communication channel.
6.3.2 Scenario 2
We consider a scenario (Fig. 6.3) in which one of the patients (e.g. P) has trav-
elled to another domain, rather than its own local area network, and requests a
communication channel for the remote consultation session with the doctor who is
still located at its home, which is managed by HS. Di↵ering from the scenario 1,
the patient P is unable to contact its home server HS directly. The communication
with HS must be mediated by the visiting remote server RS, which does not share
any secret key with P. Since HS and RS share a long-term secret key, the authen-
tication communication flows are passed by RS to the home-server HS who then
authenticates P in order to establish a consultation session with the doctor D.
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Figure 6.3: Scenario 2. The figure on the left-hand side shows the case when the
patient has travelled to the remote domain, while the doctor is still in its home
domain. The figure on the right-hand side shows the consultation phase, which is
done with the assistance of HS and RS.
1. Obtaining a ticket.
In order to establish a secure communication channel between patient and
doctor (similar to Scenario 1), the patient needs to contact their home server
to obtain a service ticket. In this scenario, the patient is located at the remote
domain (RS) and needs to contact the remote server RS that acts as a mediator.
The mutual authentication between P and D is done with the help of RS and
HS, where the service ticket plays an important role. The main hurdle for this
protocol to work is how to let the RS check whether P is a legitimate user.
Since the RS does not hold any information about P, then it is unable to verify
the authenticity of P, with the identification information provided by P. We
solve this problem by allowing the P to encrypt the data with a temporary
session key. Later, the HS can help provide such a key to the RS, therefore,
the RS can check the authenticity of the P.
(a) P! RS : Ps1,RS,D,HS, np,Token,MACtk(Ps1,RS,D,HS, np,Token)
The patient P contacts the remote server RS as the first step to obtaining
a service ticket. Here, Token = [Ps1,HS,RS, np]K
p,hs
and tk is a temporary
key for the RS to verify the MAC after it has obtained the key from the
HS. tk is derived from tk = f(Kp,hs, np,P), where f(·) is a cryptographic
hash function.





In this step, RS forwards the Token to HS in order to get the temporary
key tk. HS can decrypt Token and check the authenticity of P, and then
compute the temporary key tk = f(Kp,hs, np,P).




(HS,RS,Ps1, tk, np, nrs),
Package
where
Package = [Ps2,D, ks,Ticket]K
p,hs
,
Ticket = [P,Ps1,D, ks, T ]K
d,hs
Two main tasks in this step are: (1) HS needs to forward tk to RS. This
is done by encrypting it along with the subliminal ID of P and nonces.
nrs is initialised by RS, hence it must be returned to RS to indicate the
completion of the session between RS and HS. np is initialised by P, so
it must be forwarded to RS so that it can be returned to P in the next
step. (2) Package is sent to RS, so that it can forward it to P in the next
step. The Package contains Ticket which is sent to P in the next step.
In order for P and D to establish a secure channel for the consultation,
a session key ks is embedded in Package, to ensure both P and D will
obtain it. The doctor D will obtain ks from the service ticket Ticket when
P requests a consultation session to D.
(d) RS! P : RS,Ps1, np,MACtk(RS,Ps1, np),Package
In this step, Package is delivered to P by RS. P therefore obtains the
service ticket Ticket and the secret session key ks; hence P is ready to
contact his doctor D for consultation. As a necessary matter, P needs to
check if np is the same as the one initialised by itself in the first step. If
the checking step returns true, the entire protocol run is complete.
2. Remote consultation phase.
With the service ticket Ticket, P can then contact its doctor D. The proto-
col is the same as that in the first scenario. The only di↵erence is that the




In this case (Fig. 6.4), both patient P and doctor D have left their home domain
and are situated in a distant location. The phase of ticket granting phase for the
patient P is the same as that in the second scenario. However, since the doctor D
has also left its home domain and is located at the remote domain managed by RS,
the D needs to be authenticated by HS. Therefore, in this case, we only present this
part of the protocol.
Figure 6.4: Scenario 3. The figure on the left-hand side shows that the patient and
the doctor both have left HS and are now located at the remote domain managed by
RS. The figure on the right-hand side shows the consultation communication flows.
In order to establish a secure communication channel between patient and doc-
tor, the patient and the doctor need to contact their home server HS, since the
remote server RS does not store any information about them. The mutual authen-
tication among P and HS is done with the help of RS and HS, as the protocol given
in Scenario 2. Accordingly, D needs to be authenticated by RS in order to establish
a communication channel with its patients. Since RS does not hold any information
about D, then it can verify the legitimacy of D only with the help of HS who regis-
tered D. The authentication protocol for D is similar to the patient authentication,
while D does not require a subliminal ID and a service ticket.
1. Authentication phase.
The doctor authentication protocol is given as follows:
(a) D! RS : D,RS,HS, nd,Token,MACtk(D,RS,HS, nd,Token)
The doctor D contacts the remote server RS as the first step in order to be
authenticated. Here, Token = [D,HS,RS, nd]K
d,hs
and tk is a temporary
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key for the RS to verify the MAC after it has obtained the key from the
HS. tk is derived from tk = f(Kd,hs, nd,D), where f(·) is a cryptographic
hash function.
(b) RS! HS : RS,HS,D, nd, nrs,Token,MACK
rs,hs
(RS,HS,D, nd, nrs,Token)
In this step, RS forwards the Token to HS in order to get the temporary
key tk. The HS also checks the D’s information stored in HS in order to
authenticate D.




(HS,RS,D, tk, nd, nrs)
This step captures the following task. HS forwards tk to RS in order to
verify the authenticity of D by RS. This is done by encrypting it along
with the ID of D and nonces. RS can now verify the MAC provided by
D in the first step. This step also confirms that D is a legitimate user of
HS.
(d) RS! D : D,RS, nd, accept/reject,MACtk(RS,D, nd, accept/reject)
The protocol ends after RS confirms “accept” or “reject” to D. In a case
of “accept”, RS will keep the D0s credential for future communication.
This protocol is essential for P to be able to access the service provided
by D, since the future service to P requires RS to act as the hub to bridge
P and D.
2. Remote consultation phase.
In this phase, the patient P communicates with the doctor D by sending
Ticketp,d to D. In turn, the doctor D replies to the patient P to confirm the
establishment of the communication channel. The communication before P
and D is conducted via the home server HS and the remote server RS. Notice
that we have omitted the ticket granting phase for P as it is same as that in
Scenario 2. Therefore, similar to Scenario 2, the subliminal identity of P can
still be used to protect the patient. This requires a routing table (6.4) which
contains the information of P and D including their IDs, patient’s subliminal
ID, home domain and current location. We describe it later in this chapter.
(a) P! (RS)! D : Ps1,D, np,Ticket,MACks(Ps1,D, np,Ticket)
(b) D! (RS)! P : D,Ps1, np, ok,MACks(D,Ps1, np, ok)
(c) P! (RS)! D : · · · Consultation request
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(d) D! (RS)! P : · · · Reply
This communication channel can last while there is a necessity. All the com-
munication messages are encrypted with session key ks, which provides the
secure communication channel.
6.3.4 Scenario 4
In this scenario (Fig. 6.5), suppose a patient P lives in a remote rural area and has
registered with her home domain server RS. A doctor D resides in a major city and
has also registered with his home domain server HS. P needs to travel to di↵erent
places temporarily in which her communication requests are being forwarded to RS.
Figure 6.5: Scenario 4. The figure on the left-hand side shows the case while both P
and D have a separate home server and both reside in their own home. The figure
on the right-hand side shows the consultation phase.
P, when is in her remote area, sends requests to her home server RS in order to
establish remote consultation with D. The RS in turn contacts HS in order to obtain
a service ticket for P. A secure communication session can be established through
home servers RS and HS. The P’s home server RS is trusted by D’s home server HS
in which her requests are being sent to. Since RS can authenticate P, also HS and
RS are trusted each other, the authentication of P by HS is based on a mutual trust.
Once the authentication is done, the HS will issue a service ticket and send it
to RS who can then forward it to P. Since D is located at his home domain and
already registered, he does not need to be authenticated again.
1. Obtaining a ticket.
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In this phase, the patient P needs to contact its home server RS to obtain a
service ticket for a secure communication channel with the doctor who resides
in HS. The RS will contact the HS in order to obtain a service ticket for P.
(a) P! RS : Ps1,RS,D,HS, np,MACp,rs(Ps1,RS,D,HS, np)
The patient P contacts its home server RS as the first step to provide the
information of the doctor’s ID and its home domain, along with a nonce
np. The RS authenticates P by verifying the MAC.




(RS,HS, p,Ps1,D, np, nhs)
In this step, the patient’s home server RS contacts the home server of D
to request a service ticket for P to communicate with D.




Package = [Ps1,D, ks,Ticket]K
hs,rs
Ticket = [P,Ps1,D, ks, T ]K
d,hs
Package is sent to RS, so that it can forward it to P in the next step.
Here, T is a timestamp. The Package contains Ticket which is sent to
P in the next step. In order for P and D to establish a secure channel
for the consultation, a session key ks is embedded in Package, to ensure
both P and D will obtain it. The doctor D will obtain ks from the service
ticket Ticket.
(d) RS! P : RS,Ps1, [Ps2]Kp,rsnp,Package,MACKp,rs(RS,Ps1,Ps2, np,Package)
In this step, Package is delivered to P by RS. P therefore obtains the
service ticket Ticket and the secret session key ks; hence P is ready to
contact his doctor D for consultation. A new subliminal ID Ps2 for patient
P is delivered to P in this step. As a necessary matter, P needs to check
if np is the same as the one initialised by itself in the first step. If the
checking step returns true, the entire protocol run is complete.
2. Remote consultation phase.
In this phase, the patient P communicates with the doctor D by sending
Ticketp,d to D. In turn, the doctor D replies to the patient P to confirm
the establishment of the communication channel. The communication before
P and D is conducted via the home server HS and the remote server RS.
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(a) P! (RS)! (HS)! D : Ps1,D, np,Ticket,MACks(Ps1,D, np,Ticket)
(b) D! (HS)! (RS)! P : D,Ps1, np, ok,MACks(D,Ps1, np, ok)
(c) P! (RS)! (HS)! D : · · · Consultation request
(d) D! (HS)! (RS)! P : · · · Reply
This communication channel can last while there is a necessity. All the com-
munication messages are encrypted with session key ks, which provides the
secure communication channel.
6.4 Routing Tables
The routing tables play an important role in the protocols. Both HS and RS need to
maintain a routing table, respectively. The table should contain the information of
the real IDs of users for both patients and doctors, the up-to-date subliminal IDs for
patients, home servers of users and the current server. This is updated once a user
is registered, a change of subliminal ID, and change of user location to a di↵erent
domain. In Table 6.3, we provide an example for some cases of our protocol.
Table 6.3: Example of routing table.
ID Sub ID Home Server Current Server
P1 P1si RS RS








In this section, we present two clinical examples for our protocols. We describe how
the service should be delivered and how patients and doctors should be registered
and managed in our system to capture the features of user mobility and distributed
service.
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For a distributed telemedicine system, using multiple servers to manage the
services is essential to make the system e cient and practical for telemedical ser-
vices. Therefore, we set up multiple servers in terms of geographical locations.
We use the term “telemedicine servers” to name such service. In our protocols,
telemedicine servers are also authentication servers for our security services. There-
fore, the telemedicine servers are located at various geographical locations and also
play the role of the authentication server. In order to use the service, all doctors
and patients have to register with their local telemedicine server. There are the
following entities in our examples.
• Telemedicine servers: The servers which manage doctors and patients to pro-
vide authentication service and secure channels for communication.
• Doctors: They are medical specialists who provide special service to patients.
They usually reside in large medical centres such as hospitals or specialised
clinics. A doctor has registered with a telemedicine server at his home location
for example. He can, however, travel to a di↵erent location while can still
provide his service to his patients.
• Patients: Patients are people who need to consult with a doctor on their
illnesses. Patients have registered with a telemedicine server which is usually
located at their home location. Patients might be located in rural and deprived
areas and cannot access specialists easily. Any patient can travel to a di↵erent
location and still obtain the requested consultation with a doctor.
Our protocols presented in this work capture the aforementioned application
scenarios. The examples provided here elaborate two medical cases in order to
sketch a comprehensive picture of our solutions’ applicability.
Our protocols allow flexible communication networks such as 4G LTE mobile
service, wired internet service and WiFi networks. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the telemedicine servers are web-based servers, where the users have
registered with their valid ID.
Example 1. In this example, we show that how a patient who lives in a rural area does
not have to travel to a metropolitan city or a facilitated hospital in order to receive
a medical consultation with a specialist. Technically, this example can be explained
by Scenario 4, which has been presented earlier. Suppose that a doctor Donald who
has registered with the telemedicine server - New York City Telemedicine Service,
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and a patient Petty who has registered with another telemedicine server - Kalawao
County Telemedicine Service. Petty can visit a local clinic for her ordinary check-ups
or consultations with a General Practitioner (GP); however, in chronic conditions
or operations, her local GP cannot provide the professional advice. Then, GP refers
Petty to visit the specialist, Donald. Therefore, she can request secure remote
consultation to Donald, who is located in New York City.
With our protocol presented in Scenario 4, we can allow Petty and Donald to
establish a secure and authenticated channel for an online consultation meeting.
Petty only needs to contact the Kalawao County Telemedicine Service by the pro-
vided web service via a wired or wireless communication network. With the aid of
the New York City Telemedicine Service, the Kalawao County Telemedicine Service
can obtain a service ticket for Petty to consult with Doctor Donald over a secure
and authenticated channel. ⇤
Example 2. Now, we assume that Doctor Donald is currently treating a patient
Penny due to her chronic medical condition. Suppose both Penny and Donald have
registered with the New York City Telemedicine Service; therefore, it is convenient
for Penny to visit Donald in order to obtain his advice or treatment. However, as
part of Penny’s job, she has to travel to a di↵erent city Los Angeles. Our Scenario
2 captures this case perfectly. The procedure is as follows.
Penny needs to contact the Los Angeles Telemedicine Service through its web
service. According to our Scenario 2, even Penny has not registered with the Los
Angeles Telemedicine Service, she can successfully receive a service ticket which
allows her to establish a secure and authenticated remote communication channel
with Donald. Therefore, Penny can still consult her Doctor Donald while she resides
outside her registered region. ⇤
By employing our solutions, we ensure that a patient who is in a remote area can
still benefit from secure remote consultation meetings with a specialist via remote
servers which can significantly reduce the time and the cost involved in travelling
long distances for medical appointments. We might highlight the advantage of
distributed feature of our solutions. Any server in the system can serve as the
point of attachment for patients and doctors; therefore, it solves the bottleneck
problem in the centralised schemes.
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6.6 Security Analysis
Under the aforementioned security assumptions our protocol is secure as following
theorems:
We have defined earlier that we consider outside adversaries only. The outsiders
are those people who are not registered with the system and the insiders who have
been registered with their home server but are involved in the present protocol
execution (i.e., they do not hold the secret keys which have been used in the current
protocol run). All adversaries can launch active attacks. For simplicity, we denote
by A the adversary.
Theorem 6.1 The proposed protocol ensures the data confidentiality against the
adversary A.
A legitimate user shares a long-term symmetric key with its home server. Since the
data transmitted between a user and its home server is encrypted with the long-term
key in the ticket granting phase, to access the data, one must have the key. The
adversary A can be a registered user (patient or doctor) and hold its own shared key
with its home server, but it does not have others’ keys. Therefore, it is impossible
for A to decrypt data if the encryption scheme is secure.
For each session, there is a new session key issued for patient-doctor communi-
cation and all data flows are encrypted with this key; therefore, it is secure against
A. The confidentiality while a patient is in a remote area is achieved with the data
encrypted under a temporary key issued by the patient. Hence, A does not hold
this key.
The security is also due to the assumption that the home server is trusted to all
its users (patients and doctors). This ensures that the data received by the home
server will not be revealed to A. Also, the final session key ks which is selected by
the home server and transmitted with the help of the home server (or remote server)
cannot be obtained by the A, as we have assumed that all underlying encryption
algorithms are secure.
Theorem 6.2 The proposed protocol ensures the data integrity against the adver-
sary A.
The data integrity is obtained with the Message Authentication Code (MAC) which
is based on a secure cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-2. All transmitted
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data are embedded in MAC with a MAC key, which is, by default, the long-term
key shared by a user and its home server. This ensures that only those parties who
have that key can compute and verify a MAC value. If MAC is secure, therefore,
the integrity of the data transmission in our system is ensured.
Theorem 6.3 The proposed protocols ensure the patient anonymity against the ad-
versary A.
The user anonymity is achieved with the subliminal ID of the user. In our protocols,
even the A who has its own key cannot know other users’ identities, though they can
obtain the identity of their communication partner. The reason is threefold: (1) A
subliminal identity is used only for one round of the protocol and a new subliminal
ID is transmitted to the user securely. (2) The new subliminal ID is encrypted by
the home server, therefore, only the corresponding user can decrypt it. (3) Our
protocols also o↵er patient untraceability, which means that a patient cannot be
traced back with its previous communication transcripts. The reason is that the
subliminal ID is updated when a communication session is completed. The new
session uses a new subliminal ID.
Theorem 6.4 The proposed protocols provide the freshness in communication against
any replay attack.
We utilise nonces in our protocols. The following facts support our claim. The
communication session between two parties is accompanied with a new and random
nonce and the nonce must be returned to the initiator of the nonce to ensure the
completion of the session and ensure that the freshness can be verified. Since the
di↵erent communication session has a di↵erent nonce, the information from the
previous session cannot be applied to the current session as it has a di↵erent nonce.
In addition, the adversary can not use an old communication nonce in the future
protocols; because the server keeps a table of all the nonces for a period of time.
The freshness can be further enhanced by adding a timestamp T . Since it is a
straightforward process, we omit it in this chapter.
Theorem 6.5 The proposed protocols provide the authentication service.
Since MACs are used in our protocols, our protocols provide symmetric-key based
authentication service. That is, for two parties who share a symmetric key can
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authenticate each other due to the fact that only the party who holds the key can
compute the MAC value, therefore, the corresponding receiver of MAC value can
verify it by using the same key.
The patient is granted a ticket, which is encrypted under the doctor’s key shared
with its home server. If the doctor can decrypt it successfully, the doctor can be
ensured that the ticket was created by its home server, which implicitly authenticates
its home server. Also, if the doctor can successfully respond to the patient upon
receiving the ticket, the patient then knows that the doctor is legitimate. Since the
ticket contains the patient’s ID, the doctor will know that the patient is legitimate.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed several security protocols for practical telemedicine
applications. Our protocols o↵er security properties of data confidentiality, patient
anonymity (untraceability), data integrity, data freshness and mutual authentica-
tion. Our protocols are featured with the capability of handling user mobility along
with patient anonymity, which is not achieved in the previous studies. We presented
four practical telemedicine scenarios, in which we showed that our protocols have
provided all properties we predefined in our work. Our protocols are e cient in




Sign-encryption and Its Application in
Patient Monitoring
Computerised patient monitoring systems have been widely adopted in healthcare
applications in recent years. Although such systems have brought great e ciency
and convenience to patients and health care givers, protecting users’ privacy and
data security are still challenging issues. The main reason is that collected data
by monitoring devices is vulnerable to various attacks. Therefore, such data can
be protected via encryption schemes, which o↵er confidential protection to patient
information. Although some systems adopt digital signature schemes on the top
of encryption to ensure the authenticity of the information, handling such systems
require additional computational resources and cryptographic key management. In
this chapter, we propose a novel scheme o↵ering lightweight computations which
ensures data integrity, confidentiality and authentication. In addition, our scheme
o↵ers the following two features: (1) Signing and encrypting are carried out in one
go, unlike the traditional encryption and signature schemes which are computed
separately. (2) We allow the collected encrypted and signed data pieces to be aggre-
gated without requiring decryption. The second feature confirms the significance of
the first feature in that the traditional signcryption cannot be applied due to lack-
ing of the homomorphic property. Our scheme is the first provably secure solution
to the problem. We apply our scheme to patient monitoring devices to enhance
computational e ciency, confidentiality and authentication.
7.1 Introduction
Owing to rapid growth in mobile health applications, healthcare providers o↵er var-
ious remote medical services to improve the e ciency and convenience to healthcare
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services. These services also have great impacts on the improvement of individuals’
well-being, reducing the costs of hospitalisation and treatment [KGKW16].
In order to benefit from mobile healthcare systems, wireless body sensor net-
works, implantable medical devices, wearable mobile devices and mobile phones
have been utilised to monitor patients health conditions, such as body temperature,
blood pressure, heart rates, etc. The collected data are sent to a doctor and are
useful for the doctor to know the patient’s medical condition in case of emergencies
or the evaluation of an ongoing treatment, in a timely manner. This technology
is very helpful for patients who reside in remote or deprived areas and require an
ongoing medical care.
Encryption schemes have been commonly adapted to assure security and privacy
in patient monitoring devices. Encryption techniques can help to protect patient
information against disclosure to unauthorised parties. To achieve data authentica-
tion, a signature scheme is usually required in addition to encryption. Usually, the
data is digitally signed and then encrypted. Therefore, additional computational
resource is needed to adopt both encryption and signature schemes. However, those
schemes might be ine cient in implementing in wearable devices due to the limited
computation and communication capacity. There exists a technique “signcryption”
which integrates signing and encrypting processes into one; therefore improves the
computational e ciency.
When the amount of data is large, for example, the patient information from
repeated and regular measurements of a patient health condition such as body tem-
perature, heart rates and/or blood pressure, health data aggregation services provide
promising applications in patient monitoring devices to improve the data verification
e ciency. These information include spatial data and temporal data. Spatial data
is necessary for pharmaceutical research and production, and temporal data is im-
portant to monitor the health condition of users and timely feedbacks [HZL+16]. On
the other hand, protecting patients’ data and preserving their privacy have become
a common concern preventing patients from participating in mHealth systems. The
remote patient monitoring also incurs a high volume of vital data transferring to the
server and receiver for storage and processing, which is important to be protected
[ZCDL15]. With the tool of homomorphic encryption, encrypted data pieces can be
aggregated in terms of either additive operations or multiplicative operations. Al-
though fully homomorphic encryption is not computationally e cient for a practical
use, partial homomorphic encryption (either fully additive or fully multiplicative)
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can be e ciently constructed. However, the homomorphic property will become
infeasible if a signature is added to the encryption.
There is no any existing proper homomorphic signcryption scheme in the liter-
ature. Notice that Zhang et al. [ZYL11] introduced a homomorphic signcryption
scheme, but its security cannot be properly proved, since the simulator cannot simu-
late the entire homomorphic signcryption; instead, the simulation for the encryption
part was carried out separately without considering the signature verification. Actu-
ally, if the verification is considered, the adversary can di↵erentiate which challenge
message is encrypted by the challenger; therefore, it will not be semantically secure
as claimed in their paper. In fact, it is indeed a challenge to achieve a provably
secure homomorphic signcryption scheme mathematically.
We deem that a partially homomorphic signcryption scheme is necessary for our
system, where we want to achieve an e cient remote patient monitoring system
which captures the following features: The pieces of information collected from a
patient via his/her wearable device are sign-encrypted before sent to a computer
server managed by the healthcare provider, who in turn aggregates them into a
single piece with decrypting them. Because of the additive homomorphic property,
the sum of the data pieces is computed under the encryption shield. The encrypted
sum is then forwarded to the corresponding doctor who can obtain the average result
of the measurements.
The original signcryption scheme by Zheng [Zhe97] utilises the symmetric-like
encryption approach, which cannot adopt homomorphism in encryption. We move
slightly away from original signcryption, by introducing a useful variant. To di↵eren-
tiate it from the original signcryption, we name it “homomorphic sign-encryption”.
In this work, we propose a homomorphic sign-encryption scheme to serve our goal.
Our scheme can integrate sign-encrypted health data collected from a patient’s wear-
able device without the need of decryption. This feature is desirable when we assume
that the computer server is not fully trusted. The aggregated data is then sent to
the corresponding doctor who can then decrypt the aggregated data and verify its
authenticity. With this approach, the doctor does not need to handle data collec-
tion and aggregation, while can ensure the security of the transmitted data. In our
scheme, we assume that the receiver, i.e., the corresponding doctor is trusted by
the patients. This assumption is reasonable in the ehealth scenarios. With this
assumption, we are able to prove the security of our scheme formally.
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Our Contribution. The contribution of our work can be summarised as follows.
We propose the first secure homomorphic sign-encryption scheme. Our scheme is
provably secure. The security analysis demonstrates that our scheme achieves IND-
CPA and Weak Unforgeability (WUF) security goals, under the Decisional Di e-
Hellman assumption and the Computational Di e-Helman assumption, respectively.
Our scheme improves the secure data collection from the wearable sensor devices in
patient monitoring, in which such devices have limited computational power.
The remaining of the chapter is organised as follows. We describe the related
work in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3, we present our system model and give the
definitions of our scheme and security model. In Section 7.4, we present our scheme
followed by the security proof of our scheme in Section 7.5. We conclude the chapter
in Section 7.6.
7.2 Related work
In the literature, there are several studies dealing with patients’ data security and
privacy in distributed healthcare services and cloud computing systems [SFZ10,
YBG+16, YRL11, ZLDC15]. They presented cryptographic solutions in order to en-
sure the monitoring data protection while are being aggregated and shared with the
healthcare provider. The proposed solutions have employed signcryption schemes
which combine signature and encryption schemes together in order to ensure au-
thenticity and confidentiality.
In some studies, homomorphic encryption is used to provide secure data inte-
gration in monitoring devices. In the homomorphic encryption, the encryptions of
di↵erent messages can be combined to compute either additive or multiplicative op-
erations without revealing their inputs. In a fully homomorphic encryption, both
additive and multiplicative operations can be carried out. The homomorphic en-
cryption has been a useful method for designing secure computation protocols. In a
study proposed by Boneh et al. [BGN05], the homomorphic properties of the cur-
rent homomorphic public key systems are improved, in which given two ciphertexts,
anyone can compute both addition and multiplication. Although it is not yet a fully
homomorphic encryption, it has many useful applications. The underlying security
of the proposed scheme, named BGN, is based on a new hardness assumption named
Subgroup Decision Problem. Unfortunately, there is no any practical homomorphic
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encryption scheme yet. Although fully homomorphic encryption is not yet ready
for practical use, there have been several works, which utilise lattice-based fully
homomorphic encryption to medical system applications. For example, in [KS15],
a medical system application was proposed based on the Gentry’s homomorphic
encryption scheme [Gen09] to ensure data privacy in the public cloud.
With a natural thinking of homomorphism in digital signatures, Johnson et al.
[JMSW02] proposed a homomorphic signature scheme, which unfortunately cannot
work with any form of homomorphic encryption. Chan and Li [CL06] also proposed
a BGN authentication scheme to convey the commitments on a message in order
to provide statistically hiding and computationally binding properties under the
subgroup decision problem.
There are many works in the literature which explored the applications of partial
homomorphic encryption schemes such as Paillier’s additive homomorphic encryp-
tion [Pai99] and ElGamal encryption [El 85]. For example, Yi et al. [YBG+16]
proposed a scheme that applied multi data servers with employing the Paillier and
ElGamal cryptosystems in order to o↵er statistical analysis and also preserve patient
privacy for wireless medical sensor devices. Han et al. [HZL+16] in another study
illustrated a privacy-preserving aggregation scheme to support fault tolerance in or-
der to aggregate health data in the cloud server. They also used BGN cryptosystem
by Boneh et al. [BGN05], and proposed an aggregation protocol to compute the
average.
The signcryption scheme by Zheng [Zhe97] is able to reduce the computational
overhead of signature and encryption computation by combining them into a single
algorithm. There are enormous applications of signcryption schemes which have
been found in the literature. For example, in the studies proposed by Rao [Rao17]
and Liu et al. [LHL15], attribute based signcryption schemes for secure sharing of
health records and ensuring confidentiality and authenticity have been presented;
whereas their schemes were not designed for body sensor networks which have limited
computational complexity than cloud computing.
Despite of the usefulness of homomorphism in signcryption, it has not been ex-
plored thoroughly in research. As pointed out earlier, the homomorphic signcryption
scheme due to Zhang et al. [ZYL11] cannot be properly proved. In this chapter, we
will investigate and explore this field of research. Fortunately, we are able to con-
struct a provably secure scheme for our specific application in the patient monitoring
application.
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7.3 Definitions and Models
7.3.1 System model
Our system consists of an honest-but-curious data server, a group of doctors and a
group of patients. On top of these parties, there is a trusted server who sets up the
entire system and is responsible for the management of cryptographic keys and user
registration.
• Patient: A patient is equipped with a wireless wearable sensor device that
collects specific his/her health data. Each measurement to the patient is sign-
encrypted with our proposed cryptographic method and sent to the data server,
who in turn aggregates these data without decryption and forwards it to the
corresponding doctor.
• Doctor: In the case we considered in this chapter, a doctor is responsible for
checking his patient’s health condition by the measurement data forwarded to
him by the data server. The doctor possesses the decryption key to retrieve
the aggregated data forwarded by the data server.
• Data Server: The data server is honest-but-curious, which means that the
data server follows the correct procedure to aggregate the data items collected
from patients and is interested in the patient information, while it does not
launch any active attack. We consider only one data server in the system;
however, our method can be naturally applied to a distributed environment
for multiple data servers when the patient population is large. The data server
can be located in di↵erent geographical locations.
Patient datasets might contain di↵erent types of data, such as blood pressure
and body temperature. The evaluation of patient’s health condition is performed on
one type of data, e.g. blood pressure. Our scheme can be performed on other types
of data separately, namely, each type of data is sign-encrypted under the patient’s
private key to ensure data authenticity and the corresponding doctor’s public key
in order to ensure confidentiality. The sign-encrypted data can be verified and
decrypted by the doctor. The data server, who collects these datasets, computes
the sum for each type of sign-encrypted patient data. The data server does not
hold the decryption key, hence cannot retrieve the patient data, while can help to
aggregate the patient data.
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Figure 7.1: System Model
We illustrate our system in Fig. 7.1, where a patient, his doctor and the data
server are involved. Patient data (m0, · · · ,mn) collected from patient’s wearable
sensor are homomorphic-sign-encrypted as (HSE(m0), · · · ,HSE(mn)) and sent to
the data server, who in turn computes the aggregated data items at a specific time.
The integrated data HSE(m) is then sent to the doctor, who then decrypts and
verifies the received message, computes the average of patient data on the patient’s
health status (e.g. blood pressure) and evaluates the patient’s medical condition.
7.3.2 Complexity Assumptions
Definition 7.1 (Computational Di e-Hellman (CDH) Assumption) Let G =
hgi be a cyclic group of prime order p generated by a generator g. Given g, ga, gb 2 G




gab  A(G, p, g, ga, gb)
   a, b,2R Zp,G = hgi
⇤
. (7.1)
The CDH assumption assumes that the advantage AdvCDHA is negligible for any prob-
abilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A under the security parameter 1 .
Definition 7.2 (Decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) Assumption) Let G = hgi
and a, b 2R Zp as described in the CDH assumption. Given g, ga, gb, there exists an
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The DDH assumption assumes that the advantage AdvDDHA is negligible for any PPT
algorithm A under the security parameter 1 .
7.3.3 The Definition of Homomorphic Sign-encryption Scheme
Definition 7.3 (Homomorphic Sign-encryption) A homomorphic sign-encryption
(HSE) scheme consists of the following five algorithms:
• params  Setup(1 ). Taking as input a security parameter 1 , it outputs the
system public parameters params.
• (pks, sks)  KeyGens(params). Taking as input the system public parameters
params, it outputs a pair of public key pks and secret key sks of a sender
(patient).
• (pkr, skr)  KeyGenr(params). Taking as input the system public parameters
params, it outputs a pair of public key pkr and secret key skr of a receiver
(doctor).
• HSE(m)  Sign-encrypt(params, pkr, sks,m). Taking as input public param-
eters params, public key pkr of doctor, private key sks of the patient, and a
plaintext message m in the message space M , it outputs a homomorphic sign-
encryption HSE(m).
• m  De-sign-encrypt(params, pks, skr,HSE(m)). Taking as input public pa-
rameters params, a public key pks of the patient, a private key skr of doctor,
and a ciphertext HSE(m), it outputs plaintext message m.
• 0/1 Verify(params, pks, skr,HSE(m),m0). Taking as input public parameters
params, a public key pks of the patient, a private key skr of doctor, a ciphertext
HSE(m), and a message m0, it outputs 1, if m = m0; otherwise it outputs 0.
Remark that the system public parameters params is omitted if it is clear in the con-
text. An HSE scheme is required to have ciphertext homomorphism as the following
algorithm.
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• HSE(m) IntSign-encrypt(HSE(m1), . . . ,HSE(mn)). Taking as input HSE(m1),
· · · ,HSE(mn), it outputs the integrated homomorphic sign-encryption HSE(m),
where m = m1 + · · ·+mn.
Definition 7.4 (Completeness) An HSE scheme is complete if the following state-
ment is always true.
8m 2M, params Setup(1 ), (pks, sks) KeyGens(params),
(pkr, skr) KeyGenr(params), HSE(m) Sign-encrypt(params, pkr, sks,m),
1 Verify(params, pks, skr,HSE(m),De-sign-encrypt(params, pks, skr,HSE(m))).
7.3.4 Security model
Definition 7.5 (Confidentiality) An HSE scheme is semantically secure against
chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) if no PPT adversary A wins the following game
with non-negligible advantage with the security parameter  .
1. Setup Phase. The simulator S runs Setup to obtain system public parameters
params. Then, the simulator S runs the key generation algorithm KeyGenr to
obtain a public key and private key pair (pkr, skr) for the receiver, it gives
(pkr, params) to the adversary A.
2. Challenge Phase. A generates two plaintexts m0,m1 2M and a private key
sks of the sender, and sends to S. Then, S sets
HSE(mb)  Sign-encrypt(params, pkr, sks,mb) for a random bit b  {0, 1}. It
sends HSE(mb) to A.
3. Guess Phase. At the end of the game, A outputs a bit b0 2 {0, 1} to S and
wins the game if b0 = b.
The adversary A’s advantage in the above game is defined as
AdvIND-CPAA =
    Pr [b
0 = b]  1
2
     .
Definition 7.6 (Unforgeability) An HSE scheme is weakly unforgeable if no PPT
forger F has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. Setup Phase. The simulator B runs Setup, KeyGens and KeyGenr to obtain
two pairs of public key and private key (pks, sks) and (pkr, skr). B gives
(pks, pkr, params) to forger F .
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2. Forgery Phase. Finally, F returns a valid signature HSE(m⇤)









Note that the forger F is not allowed to perform Sign-encrypt queries to simulator
B.
7.4 Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose our homomorphic sign-encryption scheme. An HSE
scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• params  Setup(1 ). Taking as input the security parameter 1 , it outputs
system parameters params = (p, g) where G = hgi is a group of prime order p,
generated by a generator g.
• (pks, sks)  KeyGens(params). Taking as input params, the algorithm ran-
domly selects a private key sks = w 2R Zp, and computes the corresponding
public key pks = h = gw for the sender (patient).
• (pkr, skr)  KeyGenr(params). Taking as input params, the algorithm ran-
domly selects a private key skr = (x0, x1, x2) 2R Z3p, and computes the corre-
sponding public key pkr = (y0, y1, y2) = (gx0 , gx1 , gx2) for the receiver (doctor).
• HSE(m)  Sign-encrypt(pkr, sks,m). Taking as input public key pkr of the
receiver, secret key sks of the sender, and a plaintext messagem 2M = {0, 1}l
for l  n where n = 32, it computes
C0 = g
t, C1 = g





where t 2R Zp. It outputs HSE(m) = (C0, C1, C2) as the homomorphic sign-
encryption.
• m  De-sign-encrypt(params, pks, skr,HSE(m)). Given a homomorphic sign-
encrypted message HSE(m), the public key pks = h of the sender, the private
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Then the algorithm runs the below Verify algorithm to verify the message m0.
If it outputs 1, the message m0 is accepted, and the algorithm outputs m = m0.
Otherwise, the algorithm outputs ?, which is an abort symbol.
















Otherwise, the sign-encryption is rejected and it outputs 0.
The correctness can be verified as
C2 = h
x1mCx20 = g
wx1mgtx2 = ywm1 y
t
2.
• HSE(m) IntSign-encrypt(HSE(m1), . . . ,HSE(mn)). The algorithm parses the
sign-encryption HSE(mi) as (Ci,0, Ci,1, Ci,2) with randomness ti. The algorithm














































i=1 mi and t =
Pn
i=1 ti, the integrated sign-encryption HSE(m)
= (C0, C1, C2) has the same form of the original sign-encryption. Finally, the
algorithm outputs HSE(m).
7.5 Security Analysis
Theorem 7.1 If there exists a PPT algorithm A that can break the IND-CPA secu-
rity of the HSE scheme with advantage AdvIND-CPAA , then there exists a PPT algorithm
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Proof: Suppose a PPT algorithm S that acts as the simulator of the system. We
present a series of games (Game 0, Game 1 and Game 2) as follows.
• Game 0. This is the original IND-CPA game for our HSE scheme.
1. The simulator S runs Setup to obtain system public parameters params =
(p, g). Then S runs KeyGenr to generate a receiver key pair (skr, pkr) =
((x0, x1, x2), (y0, y1, y2)), and passes (pkr, params) to the adversary A.
2. The adversary A generates two plaintexts m1,m2 2M and a sender pri-
vate key sks = w. The simulator computes the sign-encryption HSE(mb) =
(C0, C1, C2) normally with a random bit b {0, 1} where






The simulator S sends HSE(mb) to the adversary A.
3. Finally, A outputs a bit b0 2 {0, 1}. If b = b0, A wins the game and S
outputs 1. Otherwise S outputs 0.
• Game 1. This game is the same asGame 0 except that the simulator replaces
yt0 with a random element R0 2 G in computing C1 in the step 2 as
t 2R Zp, R0 2R G , C0 = gt, C1 = gmb R0 , C2 = ywmb1 yt2.
• Game 2. This game is the same asGame 1 except that the simulator replaces
yt2 with a random element R1 2 G in computing C2 in the step 2 as
t 2R Zp, R0, R1 2R G, C0 = gt, C1 = gmbR0, C2 = ywmb1 R1 .
In the following, we analyse the three games presented above under the DDH as-
sumption. Then, we construct a distinguisher algorithm B and estimate its proba-
bility in distinguishing di↵erences among games. Let Ei be the event that A wins
the Game i (i.e. 1  S) for i = 1, 2, 3. By Definition 7.5, the advantage of A






Lemma 7.2 If an adversary A can distinguish the di↵erence between Game 0
and Game 1, an algorithm B can be constructed to solve a DDH problem with the
advantage
AdvDDHB = |Pr[E0]  Pr[E1]| . (7.4)
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Proof: The algorithm B obtains a DDH instance (p, g, ga, gb, Z) from its challenger.
The algorithm B proceeds the following game with the adversary A for our HSE
scheme.
1. The algorithm B samples x1, x2 2R Zp, and computes
y0 = g
b, y1 = g
x1 , y2 = g
x2 .
Then, B packs pkr = (y0, y1, y2) and params = (p, g), and sends them to the
adversary A.
2. The adversary A generates two plaintexts m1,m2 2 M and a sender private
key sks = w. The algorithm B computes the sign-encryption HSE(mb) =
(C0, C1, C2) with a random bit b {0, 1} where
C0 = g
a, C1 = g
m





Then, B sends HSE(mb) to the adversary A.
3. Finally, A outputs a bit b0 2 {0, 1}. If b = b0, A wins the game and B outputs
1. Otherwise B outputs 0.
If Z = gab, the above game is exactly the same as the Game 0. Thus, we have
Pr
⇥
1 B | Z = gab
⇤
= Pr[E0]. (7.5)
Otherwise, Z 2R G is a random element in G, and the above game is exactly the
same as the Game 1. Thus, we have
Pr [1 B | Z 2R G] = Pr[E1]. (7.6)
Therefore, by combining Eqs. (7.2), (7.5), and (7.6), we directly have Eq. (7.4) and
complete the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 7.3 If an adversary A can distinguish the di↵erence between Game 1
and Game 2, an algorithm B can be constructed to solve a DDH problem with the
advantage
AdvDDHB = |Pr[E1]  Pr[E2]| . (7.7)
Proof:
The algorithm B obtains a DDH instance (p, g, ga, gb, Z) from its challenger. The
algorithm B proceeds the following game with the adversary A for our HSE scheme.
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1. The algorithm B samples x0, x1 2R Zp, and computes
y0 = g
x0 , y1 = g
x1 , y2 = g
b.
Then, B packs pkr = (y0, y1, y2) and params = (p, g), and sends them to the
adversary A.
2. The adversary A generates two plaintexts m1,m2 2 M and a sender private
key sks = w. The algorithm B computes the sign-encryption HSE(mb) =
(C0, C1, C2) with a random bit b {0, 1} where
R0 2R G, C0 = ga, C1 = gmbR0, C2 = ywmb1 Z.
Then, B sends HSE(mb) to the adversary A.
3. Finally, A outputs a bit b0 2 {0, 1}. If b = b0, A wins the game and B outputs
1. Otherwise B outputs 0.
If Z = gab, the above game is exactly the same as the Game 1. Thus, we have
Pr
⇥
1 B | Z = gab
⇤
= Pr[E1]. (7.8)
Otherwise, Z 2R G is a random element in G, and the above game is exactly the
same as the Game 2. Thus, we have
Pr [1 B | Z 2R G] = Pr[E2]. (7.9)
Therefore, by combining Eqs. (7.2), (7.8), and (7.9), we directly have Eq. (7.7) and
complete the proof of this lemma.









1 R1) where R0 and R1 are independent random elements, which work
as one-time pads, rendering the bit b independent from adversary A’s view. There-
fore, the adversary A has no advantage of winning the game other than a random
guess. By combining Eqs. (7.3), (7.4), (7.7), and (7.10), we obtain
AdvIND-CPAA  2 · AdvDDHB .
Thus it completes the proof. Since the DDH assumption states that AdvDDHB is
negligible, we have AdvIND-CPAA is negligible for all PPT adversaries.
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Theorem 7.5 If there exists a PPT algorithm A that can break the weak unforge-
ability of the HSE scheme with advantage AdvWUFA , then there exists a PPT algorithm
B that can solve the Computational Di e-Hellman (CDH) problem with advantage
AdvCDHB   AdvWUFA .
Proof: The algorithm B obtains a CDH instance (p, g, ga, gb) from its challenger.
The algorithm B simulates the weak unforgeability game (Definition 7.6) for the
adversary A.
1. The algorithm B samples x0, x2 2R Zp, and computes
y0 = g
x0 , y1 = g
b, y2 = g
x2 .
Then, B packs pks = ga, pkr = (y0, y1, y2), and params = (p, g). After that, B
sends them to the adversary A.
2. Ultimately, A outputs a valid homomorphic sign-encryption HSE(m⇤) = (C⇤0 , C⇤1 , C⇤2)
on arbitrary m⇤ 2M .



















Therefore, we immediately obtain the theorem. Since the CDH assumption states
that AdvCDHB is negligible, we have Adv
WUF
A is negligible for all PPT adversaries.
7.6 Conclusion
Homomorphic signcryption is useful in many applications. However, it is a research
challenge to accommodate the homomorphism feature in a traditional signcryp-
tion scheme. In this chapter, we proposed a variant of signcryption, named sign-
encryption, which leads to a novel homomorphic sign-encryption scheme. With our
proposed scheme, we gave an e cient approach for patient monitoring services. We
formally proved the security of our proposed scheme.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented the comprehensive research on the protection of health data pri-
vacy and security in Electronic Health Record Systems. The thesis captures several
most interesting research themes and provides the solutions to the research problems
we have identified. Our work is based on cryptographic and access control primi-
tives, which served as building blocks for us to design secure and privacy enhanced
EHRS.
We proposed and described an EHR system model which can provide scalability
and flexibility of EHR systems in distributed environments while preserving privacy
and security of EHR data. We investigated one of the solutions to the security
and privacy issues on distributed EHR systems, which avoids using a single trusted
authority. With ABE, we can provide fine-grained access control and flexible policies
for secure EHR system infrastructures.
We presented an access control mechanism for an EHR system with the hybrid
cloud structure, which allows us to handle various types of users who possess di↵erent
access privileges. Our system features dynamic policy transformation based on some
useful cryptographic building blocks. Our novel policy transformation approach
enables EHR data to be transferred from a private cloud to a public cloud with
the corresponding transformation in the access control policy. We proposed an
implementation protocol for an application scenario.
We introduced the policy similarity to deal with multiple access control policies,
which adds a layer of functionality to implementing the XACML system. A similar-
ity value specifies the applicability of policies combination. Our approach provides
a solution for the decision maker to decide whether two or more XACML policies
should be combined, based on the value of policy similarity. Our access control
policy combination solution has been shown useful in our case study in order to
preserve the privacy of users and ensure data security.
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We proposed several security protocols for practical telemedicine applications.
Our protocols o↵er security properties of data confidentiality, patient anonymity
(untraceability), data integrity, data freshness and mutual authentication. Our pro-
tocols are featured with the capability of handling user mobility along with patient
anonymity, which is not achieved in the previous studies. Our protocols are e -
cient in terms of computation cost and speed, as they require the symmetric-key
cryptographic schemes only.
Homomorphic signcryption is useful in many applications. However, it is a re-
search challenge to accommodate the homomorphism feature in a traditional sign-
cryption scheme. We proposed a variant of signcryption, named sign-encryption,
which leads to a novel homomorphic sign-encryption scheme. With our proposed
scheme, we gave an e cient approach for patient monitoring services. We formally
proved the security of our proposed scheme.
Although we have provided useful solutions to the security problems we have
identified in EHRS, there are still many security issues in EHRS. One of problems
we have seen is that the authority who helped to set up the system has been regarded
as a fully trusted (or semi-trusted) entity. This assumption is reasonable for most
of applications. It would be desirable that we could reduce the trust level of the
authority, while we can achieve the same level of security. We leave it to our future
work.
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